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INTRODUCTION
Glossary: A partial dictionary that gives,
for a collection of terms, brief and inaccu-
rate explanations.
- R.D. Specht
Every short statement ••• is misleading (with
the possible exception of my present one).
- Alfred Marshall
Every activity -- and systems analysis is no exception
tends to develop its own vocabulary. Indeed, systems analysis,
because of its interdisciplinary nature, has been more prone than
most not only to invent new words for new concepts but also --
and more often -- to borrow established terms from the discip-
lines it employs and to change their meaning, sometimes slightly,
sometimes grossly, sometimes inconsistently. The result of this
can be confusion, misunderstanding, and failure of communication.
This glossary is an attempt at resolving part of the ambi-
guity. Sometimes, the best that can be hoped is that the reader
will be warned of a pitfall, for we cannot hope to fill them all
in, or €ven to identify them all. For example, when a word in
common use in systems analysis has three different meanings,
whose differences are often not to be determined by context,
there is little we can do beyond noting this unfortunate prac-
tice. Clearly, we are in no position to dictate "proper" usage
to the disparate community of systems analysts. On the other
hand, we have made judgments about the wise use of terminology --
stressing some meanings and ignoring others. We hope that the
result will be of use not only to the reader who is not well
versed in the literature of systems analysis but also to all
members of the systems analysis community.
The glossary, as it stands now, is tentative. It has been
ｾ ｲ ･ ｰ ｡ ｲ ･ ､ for the preliminary version of the Handbook of Applied
Systems Analysis, and the terms included are those used in the
Handbook. We invite criticism and suggestions from our readers:
What terms should be added or deleted? What definitions are in-
correct or incomplete? Does the glossary "work" as intended?
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The glossary, besides being part of the Handbook, is also
the beginning of a major task: the compilation of a multilingual
glossary of terms of systems analysis. We would therefore appre-
ciate it if comments and proposed additions were divided into two
parts: one with respect to the Handbook glossary, and the second
with respect to the projected mUltilingual glossary.
The Way.!!. Works
The structure of the glossary is designed to highlight in-
terrelations among concepts -- among the terms we sought to ex-
plain. The present sample consists of some 50 articles arranged
in alphabetical order; approximately 170 terms are defined. A
defined term is an "entry." Entries are marked by underscoring
and double brackets [[ ]] and may head an article or occur
within an article. Each term has only one entry, which may be
located by referring to the index. If a term is simply under-
scored within an article, it is a cross reference, i.e., it is
defined as an entry somewhere else in the glossary, and the index
should be referred to. The final version of the index will use
page numbers to indicate the location of entries and in addition
will register all occurrences of a term (cross references as well
as entries). A rough version of this expanded index is appended,
as is a Russian-English index to the glossary's entries.
The glossary and its index were prepared by means of the EG
and NROFF text processing programs on IIASA's UNIX Operating Sys-
tem. This accounts for some anomalies of punctuation and for the
use of double brackets and underscoring, which may seem less than
ideal. The final version will be typeset, and these unaesthetic
elements eliminated.
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ｇｌｏｓｓａｉｾｙ IN DEX
TERM SEE:
ｾ fortiori analysis
action, feasible
action space
actor
alternative
alternative, feasible
analysis, a fortiori
analysis, contingency
analysis, cost-benefit
analysis, cost-
effectiveness
analysis, decision
analysis, feasibility
analysis, input-output
(Leontief)
analysis, Leontief [Syn.
for: input-output
(Leontief)
analysis]
analysis, policy
analysis, resource
analysis, risk
analysis, risk [Syn.
for: risk assess-
ment]
analysis, risk-benefit
analysis, ｾ ･ ｮ ｳ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｶ ｩ ｴ ｹ
analysis, value
analytic model
attribute, value-
relevant
benefit
causal model
chance-constrained prob-
lem
coefficient, technologi-
cal
•• ｾ •••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• consequence
••••••••••••••• role-playing
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• a fortiori analysis
••••••••••••••• contingencyanalysis
••••••••••••••• systems analysis
••••••••••••••• systems analysis
••••••••••••••• systems analysis
••••••••••••••• systems analysis
••••••••••••••• input-output (Leon-
tief) analysis
••••••••••••••• input-output (Leon-
tief) analysis
••••••••••••••• systems analysis
••••••••••••••• resource analysis
.•.•.••••••..•• risk ,
••••••••••••••• risk
••••••••••••••• systems analysis
••••••••••••••• sensitivityanalysis
••••••••••••••• value
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• conseguence
••••••••••••••• conseguence
•••••••••••••••model
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• input-output (Leon-
tief) analysis
vii
TERM
competitive multiple ob-
jectives
computer simulation
conditional forecast
conflict situation
conflicting objectives
conjoint measurement
theory
conseguence
consequence, feasible
consequence, multiattri-
bute
consequence, single-
attribute'
consequence space
consequence tree
constraint
constraint, elastic
constraint, long-run
constraint, removable
[Syn. for: elastic
constraint]
constraint, short-run
constraint, stiff
constraint, unquestion-
able [Syn. for:
stiff constraint]
contingency analysis
correlation model
cost
cost, opportunity
cost-benefit analysis
cost-effectiveness
analysis
course of action
criterion
decision analysis
decision maker
decision maker, risk-
averse
decision maker, risk-
neutral
decision maker, risk-
prone
SEE:
Ｎ ｾ •••••••• ｾ •••• objective
••••••••••••••• sirnulation
••••••••••••••• forecast
••••••••••••••• game theory
••••••••••••••• objeGtive
••••••••••••••• value
•• ｾ •••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• consequence
••••••••••••••• consequence
••••••••••••••• consequence
••••••••••••••• consequence
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• consequence
••••••••••••••• opportunity cost
•••••••••••••• ｾ ｳ ｹ ｳ ｴ ･ ｭ ｳ analysis
••••••••••••••• systems analysis
•••••••••••••.•• systems analysis
•••••••••••••••utility
••••••••••••••• utility
•••••••••••••••utility
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'l'ERM
decision, primary
decision, secondary
decision taker [Syn.
. for: decision mak-
er]
decision theory
decision under certainty
decision under risk
decision under uncer-
tainty
decislon variables
Delphi method
demand
demand function
deterministic model
discount rate
discretization
diseconomy of scale
dominance
dynamic model
dynamic optimization
problem
economy of scale
effectiveness
efficiency
elastic constraint
environment
equilibrium price
estimation, model
evaluation
eXfiected I,ltility
experimentation
externality
feasibility analysis
feasible action
feasible alternative
feasible consequence
feasible objective
feasible set
feasible solution
forecast
forecast, conditional
forecast, sel f-
fulfilling
SEE:
••••••••••••••• secondary decision
••••••••••••••• secondary decision
••••••••••••••• decision maker
•••••••••••••••decision theory
••••••••••••••• decision theory
•••••••••••••••decision theory
•••••••••••••••optimization
••••••••••••••• dernand
Ｎ ｾ •••••••••••••model
•••••••••••••••optimization
•• ｾ •••••••••••• economy of scale
••••••••••••••• rnodel
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• demand
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• systems analysis
•••• , •••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• constraint
•••••••• ｾ ••••• ｾ ｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｴ ｲ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｴ
ｾ •••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• forecast
••••••••••• ｾ ••• forecast
ix
TERM
forecasting horizon
[Syn. for: fore-
casting leaq]
forecasting lead
formal model
gamble [Syn. for: lot-
tery]
game, multiperson
game theory
game, two-person
game, zero-sum
gaming
goal
hierarchy of objectives
hQrizon, forecasting
[Syn. for: fore-
casting leaq]
identification, model
impact
implementation
input-output (Leontief)
analysis
input-output model
integer programming
interdependence matrix,
technological
interest rate [Syn. for:
discount rate]
iterative process
judgmental model
Leontief analysis [Syn.
for: input-output
(Leontief)
analysis]
linear model
linear programming
long-run constraint
lottery
man-machine model
man-machine simulation
SEE:
••••••••••••••• forecast
••••••••••••••• forecast
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• utility
•••••••••••••••game theory
••••••••••••••• game theory
••••••••••••••• game theo(y
••••••••••••••• role-playing
••••••• $ •••••••objective
••••••••••••••• objective
••••••••••••••• forecast
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• input-output Ｈ ｌ ･ ｯ ｮ ｾ
tief) analysis
•••••••••••••••optimization
••••••••••••••• input-output (Leon-
tief) analysis
•••••••••••••••discount rate
••••••••••••••• model
ｾ •••••••••••••• input-output (Leon-
tief) analysis
••••••••••••••• ｾ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• simulation
- x -
TERt1
marginal utility
max-max rule
max-min rule
model
model, analytic
model, causal
model, correlation
model, deterministic
model estimation
model, fo rmal
model identification
model, input-output
model, judgmental
model, linear
model, man-machine
model, optimization
model parameters
model, role-playing
model, simulation
model, static
model, stochastic
model structure
multiattribute conse-
quence
multiattribute utility
function
mUltiattribute value
function
multiobjective optimiza-
tion
multiperson game
multiple objectives
nonlinear programming
objective
objective, feasible
objective function
objective, proxy
objective, scalar-valued
objective space
objective, vector-valued
objectives, conflicting
objectives, hierarchy of
SEE:
••••••••••••••• utility
•••••••••••.•••decision theory
••••••••••••••• decision theory
••••••••••••••• model
• •••••••••••• •• Inod e 1
••••••••••••••• rnodel
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• ｭ ｯ ､ ｾ ｬ
• ••••••••••••• • mod e1
••••••••• ｾ ••••• ｩ ｮ ｰ ｵ ｴ Ｍ ｯ ｾ ｴ ｰ ｵ ｴ (Leon-
tief) analysis
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• model
•••••••.•••.••. model
• ••••••••••••• •model
••••••••••••••• model
••• ｾ ••••••••••• model
•••••••••• ·••••• model
A •••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• consequence
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• value
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• game theory
••••••••••••••• objective
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• constraint
•••••••••• ｾ ••• ｾ ｯ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｭ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
••••••••••••••• obj ec tive
••••••••••••••• optimizatlon
••••••••••••••• objective
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• objective
••••••••••••••• objective
xi
TERM
objectives, multiple
operational research
[Syn. for: opera-
tions research]
operations research
opportunity cost
optimal control problem
[Syn. for: dynamic
optimization prob-
lem]
optimal solution
optimization
optimization model
optimization, multiob-
jective
optimization problem,
dynamic
optimization, single-
objective
optimum strategy
option [Syn. for: alter-
nati ve]
outcome [Syn. for:
consequence]
Pareto optimal
play
player [Syn. for: actor]
player
policy analysis
pred iction
price, equilibrium
primary decision
probabil"istic program-
ming
probabilily, subjective
program evaluation
programming, integer
programming, linear
programming, nonlinear
programming, stochastic
proxy objective
removable constraint
[Syn. for: elastic
constr ain t]
SEE:
••••••••••••••• objective
••••••••••••••• operations research
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• ｾ ｡ ｭ ･ theory
••••••••••••••• alternative
••••••••••••••• consequence
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• game theory
••••••••••••••• role-playing
- ••••••••••••••• game theory
••••••••••••••• systems analysis
••••••••••••••• forecast
••••••••••••••• demand
••••••••••••••• ｳ ･ ｣ ｯ ｮ ､ ｡ ｾ ｹ decision
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• decision theory
••••••••••••••• evaluation
••••••••••••••• optimization
•••••••••••••••optimization
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• objective
••••••••••••••• constraint
xii
TERM
resource analysis
risk
risk analysis
risk analysis [Syn. for:
risk assessment]
risk assessment
risk, decision under
risk-averse decison mak-
er
risk-benefit analysis
risk-neutral decision
maker
risk-prone decision mak-
er
role-playing
role-playing model
satisficing
scalar-valued objective
scenario
secondary decision
self-fulfilling forecast
sensitivity analysis
short-run constraint
simulation
simulation, computer
simulation, man-machine
simulation model
simulation, stochastic
single-attribute conse-
quence
single-objective optimi-
zation
spillover
state of nature [Syn.
for: environment]
state of the world
staticmodel
stiff constraint
stochastic model
stochastic programming
stochastic simulation
strategy, optimum
subjective probability
SEE:
• •••••••••••••• [ is k
• •••••••••••••• risk
• •••••••••••••• [ is k
•••••••••••••••decision theory
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• systems analysis
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• optfmization
••••••••••••••• forecast
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• simulation
••••••••••••••• simulation
•••••••••••••• • model
••••••••••••••• rnodel
••••••••••••••• consequence
•••••••••••••••optimization
••••••••••••••• externality
••••••••••••••• environment
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• game theory
•••••••••••••••decision theory
- xiii -
TERM
suboptimization
supply function
systems analysis
target
target point
target set
target value
technological coeffi-
cient
technological inter-
dependence matrix
trade-off
two-person garr,e
uncertainty
uncertainty, decision
under-
unquestionable con-
straint [Syn.for:
stiff constraint]
utility
utility, expected
utility function, mul-
tiattribute
utility function
utility function [Syn.
for: welfare func-
tion]
utility, marginal
utility theory
validation
value
value ｾ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｹ ｳ ｩ ｳ
value function, multiat-
tribute
val ue function
value-relevant attribute
vector-valued objective
verification
welfare function
zero-sum game
SEE:
••••••••••••••• demand
••••••••••••••• objective
••••••••••••••• objective
•••••••••••••••objective
••••••••••••••• objective
••••••••••••••• input-output (Leon-
tief) analysis
••••••••••••••• input-output (Leon-
tief) analysis
••••••••••••••• game theory
•••••••••••••••decision theory
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• value
••••••••••••••• value
••••••••••••••• value
••••••••••••••• consequence
•••••••••••••••optimization
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• game theory
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｛｛ｾ fortiori analysis]]
A fortiori analysis is a method of treating uncertainty that
stacks the cards against one alternative (often the one intui-
tively preferred) uy resolving questions of uncertainty in favor
of another alternative. If the initially preferred alternative
is still preferable, one has a stronger case in its favor.
See also: sensitivity analysis, contingency analysis.
[[alternative]]
One of the mutually exclusive courses of action that are
considered as means of attaining the objectives. Typically, the
alternatives differ in their nature or character, not only in
quantitative details. Oy mutually exclusive we mean that the al-
ternatives are competitive in the sense that if A is selected, B
cannot be chosen. A course of action that combines features
selected from both A and B would be a new alternative. (The
synonym "otJtion" is often used in association with the decision
If! a ke r, as in" the dec i s ion ma ke r 's 0 Pt ions we r e ••• :' )
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[[consequence]]
A consequence is a result of a course of action (or of a de-
cision) taken by the decision maker (Synonym: outcome; see
impact).
In analysis, the consequences of a course of action are
determined (predicted) by the ｾ ｳ ･ of models.
The consequences that one would like to have, particularly
those that contribute positively to the attainment of objectives,
are referred to as [[benefits;]] the consequences that one would
like to avoid or minimize are [[costs.]]
The consequences that'do not bear very much on the main ob-
jectives and are not evaluated in the analysis but that may af-
fect the objectives of other groups of people are referred to as
spillovers or externalities.
A [[consequence tree]] is a graph showing what further
consequences 'will be caused by some direct consequence of a
course of action. For exalnple, one alternative to stimulate the
economy ｬ ｾ ｡ ｹ be to lower taxes. This will result in an increase
of average family income, which will in time influence the nUlnber
of cars, which will have an impact on traffic conditions, on en-
vironmental pollution, and so on.
In the literature on decision theory it is customary to
- 2 -
speak about one [[multiattribute consequence]] of a course of ac-
tion instead of saying "the action has several consequences." Ac-
cordingly, the term [[single-attribute consequence]] is used when
the course of action has only one consequence that is being con-
sidered (e.g., monetary profit). Within the coritext of decision
theory, attributes are those features of a consequence that are
taken into account in the evaluation of this consequence by the
decision maker. One speaks, more precisely, about
[[value-relevant attributes.]]
*
In mathematical forlnulations one speaks about a mapping from
the space of courses of action [[(action space)]] into the space
of consequences [[(consequence space).]] In a deterministic case
the ｾ ｡ ｰ ｰ ｩ ｮ ｧ from action space to consequence space is a point-
to-point mapping. This means that a given course of action has a
biven and certain consequence. In a case of risk or uncertainty
tile mapping from action space to consequence space is a point-
to-set llIappin,5; that is, a ziven course of action may have any
one of the consequences contained in a given set.
In analysis, the mapping from action space to consequence
ｳ ｾ ｡ ｣ ･ is described by a model.
- 3 -
[[constraint]]
Constraints are limitations imposed by nature or by man that
do not ｾ ･ ｲ ｭ ｩ ｴ certain actions to be taken. Constraints may mean
that certain objectives cannot be achieved.
The actions, alternatives, consequences, and objectives that
are not precluded by the constraints are referred to as
[ [feasible •. ]]
In a particular analysis study, some constraints Inay have to
be considered [[stiff]] or unquestionable, others - ｦｲｯｾ among
those imposed by prior decisions - may be [[elastic]] or remov-
able if the analysis proves a good case for it. For example, the
natural water supply in a region is a stiff constraint, while the
money or manpower allocated to fulfill a certain task may be an
elastic constraint.
It is useful to distini:Suish [[short-run]] and [[long-run]]
constraints: for example, eXisting legislation is a constraint in
the short run, but not necessarily in the long run.
If
In ,uathematical terms, if the notions of action space,
consequence space, and objective space are introduced, the con-
straints determine a [[feasible set]] in each of those spaces.
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[[contingency analysis]]
Contingency analysis is a method of treating uncertainty
that explores the effect on the alternatives of changes in the
environment in which the alternatives are to function. This is a
"what-if" type of analysis, with the what-ifs being external to
the alternative, in contrast to a sensitivity analysis, where the
parameters of the alternatives are varied.
See also: a fortiori analysis.
[[course of action]]
A means available to the decision maker by which the
objectives may be attained.
A systems analysis usually considers several possible
courses of action, which are then referred to as alternatives or
as the decision makers's options.
[[criterion]]
A criterion is a rule or standard by which to rank the
alternatives in order of desirability. The use of "criterion" to
mean "objective" is incorrect.
See objective.
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[[decision maker]]
A decision maker is a person, or group of people (e.g., a
cummittee), who makes the final choice among the alternatives.
Synonym: decision taker.
[[decision theory]]
Decision theory is a body of Knowledge and related analyti-
cal techniques of different degrees of formality designed to help
a decision.maker choose among a set of alternatives in light of
their possible conseguences •. Decision theory can apply to condi-
tions of certainty, risk, or uncertainty. [[Decision under_
certainty]] means that each alternative leads to one and only one
consequence, and a choice among alternatives is equivalent to a
c ho ic e among con'se quenc es • In [[ dec i sion und er risk]] each al-
ternative will have one of several possible consequences, and the
probability of occurrence for each consequence is known. There-
fore, each alternative is associated with a probability distribu-
tion, and a choice among alternatives is equivalent to a choice
amon3 probability distributions. When the probability distribu-
tions are unknown, one speaks about [[decision under
uncertainty.]]
Oecision theory recognizes that the ranking produced by us-
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ing a criterion has to be consistent with the decision maker's
objectives and preferences. The theory offers a rich collection
,
of techniques and procedures to reveal preferences and to intro-
duce them into models of decisions. It is not concerned with de-
fining objectives, designing the alternatives or assessing the
consequences; it usually considers them as given from outside, or
ｾ ｲ ･ ｶ ｩ ｯ ｵ ｳ ｬ ｹ determined.
*
Given a set of alternatives, a set of consequences, and a
correspondence between those sets, decision theory offers concep-
tually simple -procedures for choice. .In . a decision situation
under certainty the decision rnaker's- preferences are simuiated by
a single-attribute or loultiattribute value function that intro-
duces ordering on the set of consequences and thus also ranks the
alternatives.
Decision theory for risk conditions is based on the concept
of utility (see utility, sense B). The decision maker's prefer-
ences for the mutually exclusive consequences of an alternative
are described by a utility function that permits calculation of
the expected utility for each alternative. The alternative with
the highest expected utilit; is considered the most preferable.
For the case of uncertainty, decision theory offers two main
｡ ｾ ｰ ｲ ｯ ｡ ｣ ｨ ･ ｳ Ｎ The first exploits criteria of choice developed in a
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broader context by game theory, as for example the ｛ ｛ ｾ Ｍ ｭ ｩ ｮ
rule,]] where we choose the alternative such that the worst pos-
sible consequence of the chosen alternative is better than . (or
equal to) the worst possible consequence of any other alterna-
tive, or the ｛ ｛ ｭ ｡ ｸ ｾ ｭ ｡ ｸ rule]] where we choose the alternative
such that the best possible consequence of the chosen alternative
is better than (or equal to) the best possible consequence of any
other alternative.
The second approach is to reduce the uncertainty case to the
case of risk by using [[subjective probabilities,]] based on ex-
pert assessments or on analysis of previous decisions made in
similar circumstances.
See also: game theory, optirnization, utility, value.
[[Delphi method]]
A technique to arrive at a group position regarding an issue
under investigation, the Delphi method consists of a series of
repeated interrogations, usually by means of questionnaires, of a
group of individuals whose opinions or judgments are of interest.
After the initial interrogation of each individual, each subse-
quent interrogation is accompanied by information regarding the
preceding round of replies, usually presented anonymously. The
individual is thus encouraged to reconsider and, if appropriate,
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to chanJe his previous reply in ｬ ｩ ｾ ｨ ｴ of the replies of other
.oembers of the group. After two or three rounds, the group posi-
tion is determined by averaging.
[ [demand]]
[A] As a term in economics, demand /rneans the amount of a
cOlillnodity (good or service) that would be purchased at a given
price. An associated term is [[demand function,)] which presents
the Lie:lland-versus-price relationship. A demand function for a
given commodity is compared with a corresponding [[supply
function]] to determine the [[eguilibrium price:]] a price at
,mien the supply offered matches the demand.
[B] In another ｕ Ｎ Ｕ ｃ Ｚ ｬ ｾ ･ Ｌ deman,j means the amount of a commodity
required for a certain purpose. It often relates to the future,
as in: lithe ｾ ｊ ｏ ｲ ｬ ､ energy demai1d in the year 2030 will be 35
terawatts." Implicit in this statement is that the price of ener-
gy as well as other economic conditions will be such that 35
terawatts will be consumed (purchased) if technically available.
[[discount rate]]
It is assumed that a illonetary unit receiverl today is
Illore than C:l monetary unit to be received a yet:lr from now.
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worth
This
｡ｳｳｵｭｾｴｩｯｮ requires that, in order to determine the present value
of future sums, the analyst use an interest rate to discount
these future sums. If i is the assumed annual interest or
discount rate, ･ ｸ ｰ ｲ ･ ｾ ｳ ･ ､ as a decimal, the present value of x
,
monetary units t.o be received n years froln now is given by the
fOrluul a:
Present value = xｾＭＭＭ
(1+ 1) n
Discount rates are used when ｣ｯｾｰ｡ｲｩｮｧ alternatives that differ
in the time-character of their flows of costs and benefits; to
cO!llpare thelil, costs and benefits are discounted to the same year.
There are no clearqut rules as to what an appropriate discount
rate should be in a biven case.
[[dominance]]
An alternative is said to be dominant with respect to a
second alternative whenever one or more of the consequences of
the first are superior (I.e., preferred according to some
criterion) to the corresponding consequences of the second, and
all others are equally valued.
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[[economy of scale]]
Relative saving ("economy") realized when the size of a
plant, enterprise, etc., is increased. For example, lower pro-
duction cost of an automobile due to production of a large number
of cars of the same type is due to economy of scale.
There may also exist a [[diseconomy of scale,]] where the
increased size contributes to an increase in unit cost.
[[effectiveness]]
In systems analysis, the effectiveness of an alternative is
usually represented by an aggregative expression approximating
the totality of output or performance aspects of that alternative
that are relevant to goal attainment. Ideally, it is a single
quantitative measure that can be used to evaluate the performance
level achieved in attaining the objectives.
[[efficiency]]
Program A is said to be more efficient than program B if,
for a given cost, a chosen aggregated measure of its positive
results (such as effectiveness or benefit) is greater than that
for program B.
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[[environment]]
-----,.
Environment is Illost often used <1$ a ｳｹｮｯｮｹｾｮ of state of na-
ture, a concept useful in ｭ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ ｩ ｮ ｾ Ｎ It embraces all external
factors or forces that are beyond the influence of the decision
loaker but nevertheless affect the consequences of his action.
Environment is also occasionally used as a synonym of state
of the world. The difference between the two concepts is that
state of the world can include the consequences of a course of
action as well as the external factors, while the state of nature
comprises the external factors only.
[[evaluation]]
Evaluation as used in a technical sense in the United States
means assess:nent of a government program's past or ｯ ｮ ｾ ｯ ｩ ｮ ｧ per-
formance. The key issue in [[program evaluation]] is to deter-
mine the extent to which the program, rather than other factors,
has caused any changes that have been observed.
｛ ｛ ･ ｸ ｰ ･ ｲ ｩ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｝ ｝
In systems analysis, experimentation is the process of
determining the results of a proposed course of action or progra:ll
f
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ｾｹ conductin3 an experiment on a smaller scale in which the
course of action is applied to a sample drawn from the future
ｴ ｾ ｲ ｧ ･ ｴ group. An example would be ｾ test of a new health policy
in ｾ restricted region instead of the whole country, or a test on
a randomly selected sample of the population. The results are
best when the experiment is controlled -- i.e., when the test and
control groups dre chosen before program implementation in such a
way that they are as silililar as possible. In this way, any
differences that are observed during the experiment can be as-
cribed to the program.
Experimentation is used whenever current knowledge and
understanding of factors such as social attitudes and group
ｾ ｲ ･ ｦ ･ ｲ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ ｳ are not sufficient to provide dependable model-based
predictions. (See: model)
[[externality]]
An externality is a consequence not considered in analysis.
An externality that affects the interests of other groups of peo-
ple or other decision makers is referred to as a [[spillover.]]
If the effects of an externality are appreciable, it may have to
be taken into account (internalized) in the analysis.
The t e r m ex t ern ali t y d e r i ve s fr om ec 0 no mi c S, wile r e exte r rl al-
ites are costs or benefits not taken into account in a transac-
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tion or system of ｴ ｲ ｡ ｮ ｳ ｾ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ Ｎ For example, the cost borne by
others when an industry pollutes a stream would be referred to as
an externality.
[[forecast]]
A forecast is a statement, usually in probabilistic terms,
about the future state or properties of a system based on a known
past and present.
A [[conditional forecast]] states in probabilistic terms
what the future will be if a course of action is taken.
A forecast that states with a high degree of confidence what
the future will be is referred to as [[prediction.]]
A forecast that is a hypothesis rather than a formally jus-
tified inference from ｾ ｡ ｳ ｴ data is referred to as a scenario.
Forecasting techniques range from expert judgements to
mathematical forecasting models. The [[forecasting lead]] (fore-
casting horizon), is the length of time ahead of now for which
one can make a reasonable forecast. It depends, in the general
sense, on available data.
A forecast that makes itself come true is referred to as a
[[self-fulfilling forecast.]] For example, a forecast for the ra-
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iJid 3rowth of a certain city ,nay encourdge business to locate
there, thus causing the forecast to be realized.
[[game theory]]
Game theory is a branch of mathematical analysis developed
to study decision making in [[conflict situations.]] Such a si-
tuation exists when two or more decision makers who have dif-
ferent objectives act on the same system or share the same
resources. There are [[two-person]] and [[multiperson games.]]
Game theory provides a mathematical process for selecting an
[(optimum strategy]] (that is, an optimum decision or a sequence
of decisions) in the face of an opponent who has a strategy of
his own.
*
In e!.alne theory one usually makes tIle followin3 assumptions:
(1) Each decision maker [["player"]] has available to him tHO
or more well-slJecified choices or sequences of choices
( call ed [[ liE..!..a ys II) • ] ]
(2) Every possible combination of plays available to the
players leads to a well-defined end-state (win, loss, or
draw) that terminates the game.
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(3) A specified payoff for each player is associated with each
end-state (a [[zero-sum game]] means that the sum of
payoffs to all players is zero in each end-state).
(4) Each decision maker has perfect knowledge of the game and
of his opposition; that is, he knows in full detail the
rules of the game as well as the payoffs of all other
players.
(5) All decision makers are rational; that is, each player,
given two alternatives, will select the one that yields
him the greater payoff.
The last two assumptions, in particular, restrict the appli-
cation of game theory in real-world conflict situations.
Nonetheless, game theory has provided a means for analyzing many
problems of interest in economics, management science, and other
fields.
[[impact]]
Impact is used in three different ways:
[A] as synonymous with consequence;
[B] to mean any consequence (beneficial or adverse) that
reaches beyond the direct purpose of a given course of action, as
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In: "the impact of the new steel plant on employment opportuni-
ties in the region;"
[C] as in [8], but the meaning restricted to adverse conse-
quences, as in: "the impact of industrial growth on the ecologi-
cal environment."
[[implementation]]
Implementation means ｾ ｨ ･ process of carrying out a course of
action. Implementation starts at the decision and terminates
when the objectives are attained.
[[input-output (Leontief) analysis]]
Input-output (Leontief) analysis is a technique developed
for quantitatively analyzing the interdependence of producing and
consuming units in an economy. Input-output analysis studles the
interrelations among producers as buyers of each other's outputs,
as users of resources, and as sellers to final consumers. For
example, if a planner wishes to expand the activities of some in-
dustry, or some component of final consumption, an input-output
analysis can tell what amount of other manufactured goods,
resources, and labor this requires.
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*In an [[input-output model]] the output product of each sec-
tor of the economy is set equal to the input consumption of that
product by other industries plus the consumption by final consu-
mers. All inputs and outputs are expressed in the same units
(usually in monetary units per unit of time, for example in
schillings/year). One denotes a ij the worth of output product of
sector i required as input by sector j to produce one unit's
worth of its product. Then, if we denote x l ,x 2 , ••• x n the output
products of the sectors, the basic relation of the model is:
n
X.=
1
j=l
a· .x. + y.
1)) 1
where Yi is the consumption of product i by final consumers. In
a model with three sectors, we have, for example, for the output
which reads: "out of the total output x 2 the amount a 2l xI is used
by sector 1 to produce output xl' ••• ' and the amount Y2 is con-
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sumed by final consumers."
The parameters a ij are referred to as [[technological
coefficients.]] They are usually arranged into a table called the
[[technological interdependence matrix]] for the system being
modeled.
[[iterative process]]
An iterative process is a process for calculating a desired
result by means of a repeated cycle of operations. An iterative
process should be convergent, i.e., it should come closer to the
desired result as the number of iterations increases.
[[model]]
A model is a device, scheme, or procedure typically used in
systems analysis
i
to predict the conseguences of a course of
action; a model usuall¥ aspires to represent the real world (to
the degree needed in analysis) -- for example, a relation between
some observed phenomena.
A model can be [[formal]] (e.g., a mathematical expression,
a diagram, a tatle) or [[judgmental]] (e.g., as formed by the
deductions and assessments contained in the mind of an expert).
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Some models are [[causa!]] i.e., they reflect cause-
effect relationships. Others are [(correlation models,]] which
Jo not necessarily reveal Hllether some of the observed phenomena
are the cause of the otllers. An example is correlation models
used for ｾ ･ ｡ ｴ ｨ ･ ｲ forecasting; note that the farmer who predicts
rain on the basis of some observed phenomena and his past experi-
ence is using a ｪｵｊｾｭ･ｮｴ｡ｬ correlation model.
A ((deterministic nlodel]] ｾ ･ ｮ ･ ｲ ｡ ｴ ･ ｳ the response to a given
input by one fixed law; a ｛Ｈｾｴｯ｣ｨ｡ｳｴｩ｣ model]] picks up the
response from a set of possible responses according to a fixed
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｢ ｡ ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ distribution (stochastic Inodels are used to simulate
the behav ior of real syste,ns under random cond i tions.
A ((dyna:nic model]] can describe the time-spread phenomena
(<..Iynafoic processes) in a system. A [[static model]] describes
the syste:n at a given instant of tirne and in an assull1ed state of
equilibrium.
Among the formal, luathematical Iliodels an [[analytic model]]
is formed by explicit equations. It may pertuit an analytic or
nUlilerical solution.
An analytic model is [[linear]] if all equations in the
model are linear.
We speak of a [[simulation model]] if the solution, i.e.,
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the answer to the question which the analyst has posed, is ob-
tained by experiments on the model rather than by an explicit
solution algorithm. A typical example is [[stochastic
simulation,]] where one wants to obtain probabilistic properties
of a system's response by evaluating the results of a large
number of simulation runs on the model.
In some analyses the model by which one predicts the outcome
of a course of action must take into account that this outcome
depends also on actions taken by other decision makers. If the
assumption can be made that those decision makers optimize some
defined objective functions, and all the other aspects of the
system can also be formalized, an [[optimization model]] (e.g., a
linear erogramming model) can be used to determine the system's
response to a course of action. In [[role-playing models]] those
decision makers (and perhaps some other elements of the system as
well) are simulated by 11urnan actors.
In a ｛｛ｾＭｭ｡｣ｨｩｮ･ model]] an actor or actors play roles
while other parts of the model are implemented on a computer.
A formal model has a [[structure]] (the form of an equation,
for example) and [[earameters]] (the values of coefficients in an
equation, for example). Determination of both the structure and
parameters is [[model ldentification;]] determination of parame-
ters an the basis of experimental data is [[model estimation.]]
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The check of a proposed model against experimental data other
than those used for parameter estimation is model validation.
See also verification.
[[objective]]
An objective is something that a decision maker seeks to ac-
complish or to obtain by .£leans of his decision. A decision maker
l/lay have more than one objective (the [[mul tiple-objectives]]
case) .
An objective may be specified in a more or less general
fashion, may be quantified or not quantified, and is usually part
of a [[hierarchy of objectives.]] The term [[]..oal]] is sometimes
used to denote a very general objective (at the top of the
ｾ ｩ ･ ｲ ｡ ｲ ｣ ｨ ｹ Ｉ and [[target]] is used to mean a very definite objec-
tive. Example: "The goal of allocating money to the municipality
was to increase the quality of urban life. The immediate objec-
tives were to improve pUblic transportation and fire services. A
1JS reduction of average travel time from home to work and a ＱＰｾ
decrease of average alarm-to-action time taken by the fire bri-
gades were set forth as targets".
The multiple objectives of a single decision maker are usu-
ally [[competitive:]] i.e., the improvement in one of them is as-
sociated with a deterioration in another (usually because of lim-
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ited resources or because of other constraints}.
Competitive objectives are sometimes referred to as
[[conflicting objectives.]] However, one should speak about a
conflict and about conflicting objectives only if there are two
or more decision makers who have different objectives and who act
on the same system or share the same resources. In the example
given above, the director of urban transportation and the direc-
tor of city fire services have conflicting objectives. At the
same time the mayor of the city, if he were the single decision
maker, would look at these objectives as competitive.
If the two directors are left without a coordinating influ-
ence by the mayor (who would, for example, decide how to allocate
the resources), a conflict situation may result. (see game
theory).
With the mayor's interventions, the system becomes a hierar-
chy of decision makers, and the conflict may be resolved.
When the extent to which an objective is attained is measur-
able on some appropr iate scale, one can speak about the de.gree of
attainment of the objective.
In systems analysis, one often uses ((proxy
objectives other than the original ones, but
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objectives:)]
such that are
-measurable and can be quantitatively discussed. A proxy objec-
tive should at least point in the same direction as the original
ｯ ｮ ･ ｾ for example, "reduction of mean travel time" in urban tran-
sportation is a proxy for "improved services."
*
In a mathematical description, the measures of the multiple
objectives Ql,Q2, ••• ,Qn are considered to be coordinates of a
point in the n-dimensional [[objective space.]] Then, the
[[target values]} T1 ,T 2 , ••• ,Tn prescribed for the n objectives
are considered to be coordinates of the [[target point]] in this
space. When the target value requirements are set forth as some
intervals rather than single numbers, they define a region in the
objective space that is referred to as a [[target set.]]
[[operations research]]
Operations research (operational research in Britain) as un-
derstood today is essentially identical to systems analysis. His-
torically, it was a narrower area of activity that stressed quan-
titative methods and did not concern itself with trade-offs
between objectives and means or with problems of equity. It was
defined by the Operational Research Society of Great Britain as
follows (Operational Fesearch Quarterly, 13(3): 282, ｾ Ｙ Ｖ Ｒ Ｉ Ｚ
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Operational research is the attack of lilodern science on
complex problems arisin& in the direction and manage-
men t of large system 5 of men, Iliac hi nes, ma ter i al sand
illoney in industry, business, governlolent and defence.
Its distinctive approach is to develop a scientific
model of the system, incorporating ｭ ･ ｡ ｳ ｵ ｲ ･ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ ｳ of fac-
tors such as chance and risk, with which to predict and
compare the outcomes of alternative decisions, stra-
tegies or controls. The purpose is to help management
determine its policy and actions scientifically.
[[opportunity ｾ ｝ ｝
Opportunity cost 1s defined as the advantage forgone as the
result of the acceptance of an alternative. It is measured as the
benefits that would result from the next best alternative use of
the same resources that WaS rejected in favor of the one accept-
ed. Opportunity cost is difficult, perhaps impossible, to meas-
ure precisely.
Optimization is an activity that aims at finding the best
(i.e., optimal) solution to a problem. For optimization to be
ｬ Ｂ ･ ｾ ｮ ｩ ｮ ｧ ｦ ｵ ｬ there ｾ ｵ ｳ ｴ be an objective function (see below) to be
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optimized and there must exist more than one [ [feasible
solution,] ]
constraints.
i. e. , a solution which does not violate the
The term optimization does not apply, usually, when the
number of solutions permits the best to be chosen by inspection,
using an appropriate criterion (see decision theory).
One distinguishes [[single-objective]] and [[multiobjective
optimization.]] In the first case the objective is
[ [scalar-val ued]] (it can be measu red by a sing Ie number); in the
second, the objective is ｛ ｛ ｶ ･ ｣ ｴ ｯ ｲ ｾ ｶ ｡ ｬ ｵ ･ ､ ｝ ｝
pressed. by an n-tuple of numbers).
*
(its value is ex-
In mathematical terms, the formulation of an optimization
problem involves [[decision variables,]] ｸ ｬ Ｌ ｸ Ｒ Ｌ ｾ •• ,xn' the
[[objective function,]]
and constraint relations, usually of the form
The [[optimal solution]] (or "solution to the optimization
problem") are values of decision variables xl ,x 2 , ••• ,xn that
satisfy the constraints and for which the objective function at-
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L.2ins a maximum (or a millimutrl, in a minimizatiun problem).
Very few optimizatiun problems can be solved analytically,
tbat is, by lneans of eXlJlicit formulae. In most practical cases
｡ ｾ ｰ ｲ ｯ ｾ ｲ ｩ ｡ ｴ ･ computational techniques of ｯ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｈ ｮ ｵ ｭ ｾ ｲ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｬ
procedures of optimization) must be used. Among those techniques
[[linear .Erogralllming]] lJermits the solution of problems in which
tile objective function and all constraint relations are linear;
[[nonlinear ｾ ｲ ｵ Ｖ ｲ ｡ Ｚ ｴ ｬ ｬ ｬ ｬ ｩ ｮ Ｚ ｳ ｝ ｝ does not have this restriction, but can
manage many fewer decision variables and constraints; [[ integer
ｾ ｲ ｯ ｧ ｲ ｡ ｭ ｭ ｩ ｮ ｧ ｝ ｝ serves to solve problems where the decision vari-
ables can take only integer values; ｛ ｛ ｳ ｴ ｯ ｣ ｨ ｡ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｝ ｝ or
[[probabilistic programming]] must be used for problems where the
objective function or constraint relations contain random-valued
parameters (in the latter case, the problel:l is referred to as a a
[[chance-constrained prublem).]]
A special class is [[dynamic optimization problems,]] where
the decision variables are not real numbers or integers but func-
tions of one or loore independent variables -- functions of time
or ｳ ｰ ｾ ｣ ･ coordinates, for example. Dynamic optimization problems
are sometimes referred to as "optimal control problems." There
ex 1st spec ial techn ique s to solv e suc h probl ems; the y often make
use of [[discretization]] of the independent variables, for exam-
pIe dividing the time axis into a number of intervals and consid-
,
ering the solutions to be constant uver those intervals.
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A :single-objective optiloization problem may have (and usual-
ly does have) a single-valued, unique solution.
Tne solution to a ｩＱｬｵｬｴｩｯｾｪ･｣ｴｩｶ･ problem is, as a rule, not
a particular value, but a set of values of decision variables
such that, for each element in this set, none of the objective
functions can be further increased without a decrease of some of
,
the remaining objective functions (every such value of a decision
variable is referred to as [[Pareto-optimal).]]
[[resource analysis]]
The process of determining the economic resource impacts of
alternative proposals for future courses of action. While in
resource analysis, physical quantities are often ultimately
translated into IrlOnetary terms, the real aim is to measure the
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｾ ｡ ｢ ｬ ･ "resource drain" on the economy that would result from
various possible actions. The resource analyst must not only
live attentiun to economic costs but also has to determine if it
is feasible to obtain needed physical material and manpower in
the required time period.
[[risk]]
[A] In decision theory and in statistics risk
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means
uncertainty for which tile probability distribution is known. Ac-
cordingly, [[risk analysis]] :ueans a study to determine the out-
COllIes of decisions along ｾ ｶ ｩ ｴ ｨ their probabilities -- for exalilple,
answering the Ｔ ｵ ･ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｚ "what is the likelihood of achieving a
1,000,000 schilling profit in this alternative?"
In systems analysis, a decision maker is often concerned
with the probability that a project (the chosen alternative) can-
not be carried out with the time and money available. This risk
of failure may differ from alter:-native to alternative and should
be estimated as part of analysis.
[13] In another usage, risk means an uncertain and strongly
adverse impact, as in "the risks of nuclear power plants to the
ｰ ｯ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ are •••. " In that case, risk ｡ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｾ ｳ ｩ ｳ or [[risk
assessment]] is a study composed of two parts, the first dealing
with the identification of the strongly adverse impacts, and the
second with determination of their respective probabilities.
Compare risk-benefit analysis.
[ [role-playing]]
A type of sirtlulation in which persons (referred to as
[[actors]] or players), sometimes with the aid of computers, act
out roles as parts of the system being analyzed.
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to
For example,
simul a te the
experts ill different fields may be called upon
behavior (to IJreJict the response) of specific
se6ments of a regional or national economy being studied.
A,role-playing sirllulation in w:1ich the actors (players) act
out roles as decision makers is called [[gaming.]] In gaming, the
players usually [lave different and conflicting objectives (in
business gaming and war gamin3, for example). The players may
ｾ｣ｴ as individuals or may be combined into coalitions, or oppos-
i n6 tea:t1s.
[[satisficin3]]
Satisficing is an alternative to optimization for cases
ｾ Ｏ ｉ ｬ ･ ｲ ･ tbere are multiple and competitive objectives in which one
gives up the idea of obtaining a "best" solution.
In this approach one sets lower bounds for the various ｯ ｾ ﾭ
jectives that, if attained, will be "good enough" and then seeks
3 solution that will exceed these bounds. The satisficer's phi-
losophy is that in real-world problems there are too many uncer-
tainties and conflicts in values for there to be any hope of ob-
taining a true optimization and that it is far more sensible to
set out to do "well enough" (but better than has been done previ-
ously) •
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[ [scenario]]
A scenario is an outline of a hypothesized chain of events.
The term is used to denote [A] a forecast based on loose assump-
tions rather than on a more formal inference from the past or [D]
a synopsis of a proposed course of action.
[[secondary decision]]
Secondary decisions are those choices made by the analyst
that determine the way in which systems analysis of a given prob-
lem or issue will be performed. They include making the simpli-
fying assumptions by which a complex issue will be. made tractable
in analysis, choosing the forms of models,. selecting the tech-
niques of computation and simulation, deciding what data have to
be acquired, judging what support by experts of various discip-
lines to use in performing the analysis, and so on.
The secondary decisions are distinguished from [[primary
decisions,]] that is, the decisions to be taken by the decision
maker and related to the object problem or issue to which a sys-
tems analysis is applied.
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[[sensitivity analysis]]
A procedure to determine the sensitivity of the outcomes of
an alternative to changes in its parameters (as opposed to
changes in the environment; see contingency analysis, a fortiori
analysis). If a small change in a parameter results in relative-
ly large changes in the outcomes, the outcomes are said to be
sensitive to that parameter. This may mean that the parameter
has to be determined very accurately or that the alternative has
to be redesigned for low sensitivity.
[[simulation]]
Simulation is the term applied to the process of modeling
the essential features of a situation and then predicting what is
likely to happen by operating with the model case by case
i.e., by estimating the results of proposed actions from a series
of imaginary experiments (imaginary because they are performed on
the representation of the situation, the model, rather than on
the situation itself).
Most frequently, the simulation is a [[computer simulation]]
in which the representation is carried out numerically on a digi-
tal computer. It may also be done on an analogue computer or by
means of a physical representation, say by a wooden airfoil in a
wind tunnel. [[Man-machine simulation]] is a simulation that em-
(
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ploys a ｾＭｭ｡｣ｨｩｮ･ model.
Also see: role playing, gaming.
[[state of the world]]
State of the world, in connection with a course of action,
means the aggregate of natural, economic, social, cultural, and
other condi tions on which the presumed rconsequences must depend
and to which the course of action must be matched. A forecast of
the state of the world is required to predict the results of any
course of action.
See environment.
[[suboptimization]]
Suboptimization refers to the analysis to assist a lower
level decision as a step toward the attainment of a higher level
objective to which the lower level decision is to contribute.
Thus, an optimization of a city's streetcar operations would be a
suuoptirnization if tile higher level aim is to optimize the entire
public transport system.
Analysts and decision makers must always suboptimize -- that
is, consider actions that pertain to only part of the elements
that enter a problem -- neglecting some things and fixing others
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arbitrarily. Even if all sUboptimization problems relevant for a
tligher level problem are successfully solved, this will not mean,
usually, that the higher level problem will be optimized. One
could usually do better by treating all partial problems and
their interrelationships, simultaneously.
[[systems analysis]]
This term has many different meanings. In the sense adopted
for the Handbook, systems analysis is an explicit formal inquiry
carried out to help someone (referred to as the decision maker)
identify a better course of action and make a better decision
than he might otherwise have made. The characteristic attributes
of a problem situation where systems analysis is called upon are
complexity of the issue and uncertainty of the outcome of any
course of action that might reasonably be taken.
Systems analysis usually has some combination of the follow-
ing: identification (and re-identification) of objectives,
constraints, and alternative courses of action; examination of
the probable consequences of the alternatives in terms of costs,
benefits, and risks; presentation of the results in a comparative
framework so that the decision maker can make an informed choice
from among the alternatives.
The typical use of systems analysis is to guide decisions on
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issues such as national or corporate plans and programs, resource
use and ｾ ｲ ｯ ｴ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ policies, research and Jevelopment in technol-
ogy, regional and urban development, educational systems, and
health and other social services. Clearly, the nature of these
ｾ ｲ ｯ ｢ ｬ ･ ｭ ｳ requires an interdisciplinary approach.
There are several specific kinds or focuses of systems
analysis, for which different terms are used.
A systems analysis related to public decisions is often re-
ferred to as a [[policy analysis]] (in the United states the
terms are used interchangeably).
A systems analysis that concentrates on comparison and rank-
ing of alternatives on the basis of their known characteristics
is referred to as [[decision analysis.]]
That part or aspect of systems analysis that concentrates on
finding out whether an intended course of action violates any
constraints is referred to as [[feasibility analysis.]]
A systems analysis in which the alternatives are ranked in
terms of effectiveness for fixed cost or in terms of cost for
equal 'effectiveness is referred to as [[cost-effectiveness
analysis.]]
[[Cost-benefit analysis]] is a study where for each alterna-
tive the time stream of costs and the time stream of benefits
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(ootil in monetary units) are di5counted (see: discount rate) to
yield their ｾ ｲ ･ ｳ ･ ｮ ｴ values. The comparison and ranking are made
in terms of net benefi ts (benefi ts minus cost) or the ratio of
benefits to costs.
In [[risk-benefit analysis,]] cost (in monetary units) is
assigned to each risk, so as to [Ilake possible a comparison of the
discounted sum of these costs (and of other costs as well) with
the discounted sum of benefits that are predicted to result from
the decision. The risks considered are usually events whose pro-
bability of occurrence is low, but whose adverse consequences
w-uuld be illlj.)urtant (e.g., events such as an earthquake or explo-
sion of a plant).
See: operations research.
[ [trade-off] ]
Trade-off means an exchange of one quality or thin3 for
another. Thus, in comparing al ternative configurations for tran-
sport aircraft, it may be possible to trade off speed for payload
and still maintain the same total transport capability per month
in the system.
In value analysis and decision theory the concept of ｴ ｲ ｡ ､ ･ ｾ
offs in the ｾ ･ ｣ ｩ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ rnaker'E preferences is used extensively as a
basis for establishing multiattribute value functions and
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multiattribute utility functions.
See: value, utility.
[[uncertainty]]
Because of an unfortunate use of terminology, in systems
analysis discourse, the word "uncertainty" has both a precise
technical meaning and its loose natural meaning of an event or
situation that is not certain.
In decision theory and statistics a precise distinction is
made between a situation of risk and one of uncertainty. There
is an uncontrollable random event inherent in both of these si-
tuations. The distinction is that in a risky situation the un-
controllable random event comes from a known probability distri-
bution, whereas in an uncertain situation the. probability distri-
bution is unknown.
[[utility]]
[A] In economics, utility means the real or fancied ability
of a good or service to satisfy a human want. An associated term
is [[welfare function]] (synonym: utility function -- not to be
confused with utility function in decision theory; see below),
which relates the utility derived by an individual or group to
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the goods and services that it consumes. [[Marginal utility]] is
the change in utility due to a one-unit change in the quantity of
a good or service consumed.
[B] In decision theory, utility is a measure of the desira-
bility of consequences of courses of action that applies to deci-
sion making under risk that is, under uncertainty with known
probabilities.
The concept of utility applies to both single-attribute and
multiattribute consequences.
The fundamental assumption in [[utility theory]] is that the
decision maker always chooses the alternative for which the ex-
pected value of the utility [[(expected utility)]] is maximum.
If that assumption is accepted, utility theory can be used
to predict or prescribe the choice that the decision maker will
make, or should make, among 'the available alternatives. For that
purpose, a utility has to be assigned to each of the possible
(and ｭ ｵ ｴ ｵ ｾ ｬ ｬ ｹ exclusive) consequences of every alternative. A
[[utility function]] is the rule by which this assignment is
done, and depends on the preferences of the individual decision
maker.
*
In utility theory, the utility measures u of the conse-
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quences are assumed to reflect a decision maker's preferences in
the following sense:
(i) the numerical order of utilities for consequences
preserves the decision maker's preference order among the
consequences;
(ii) the numerical order of expected utilities of alternatives
(referred to, in utility theory, as gambles or
[[lotteries)]] preserves the decision maker's preference
order among these alternatives (lotteries).
For example if alternative A can have three mutually ex-
clusive consequences, x,y,z, and the decision maker prefers z to
y and y to x, the utilities ul ,u 2 ,u 3 assigned to x,y,z must be
such that u3>u2>u l •
If the probabilities of the consequences x,y,z are
Pl,P2,1-Pl-P2' respectively, the expected utility of alternative
A is calculated as
where P means the probability distribution, characteristic for
the ｡ ｬ ｴ ･ ｲ ｾ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ (i.e. Pl,P2,1-Pl-P2).
If the decision maker prefers alternative B, which has pro-
bability distribution Q, to alternative A, the utility assign-
- 39 -
ments in both alternatives must be such that
E(uIQ) > E(ulp).
Utility theory provides a basis for the assignment of utili-
ties to consequences by formulating necessary and sufficient con-
ditions to satisfy (i) and (ii).
A utility function is defined mathematically as a function
u(·) from the set of consequences Y into the real numbers that
provides for satisfaction of (i) and (ii).
There exist various methods for constructing utility func-
tions. The best-known method is based on indifference ｪ ｾ ､ ｧ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｳ
of the decision maker about specially constructed alternatives
(lotteries).
Utility theory permits one to distinguish [[risk-prone,]]
[[risk-neutral]] and [[risk-averse decision makers.]]
For example, if the mutually exclusive payoffs x l ,x2 ,x 3 of
an alternative A are all expressed in the same units (e.g.,
schillings), the decision maker is risk-prone if he prefers the
alternative A (prefers the lottery) to receiving, with no risk,
the expected value of the payoffs (calculated directly as E(xIP)
= Plxl + P2x2 + (I-PI-P2)x3 ). This preference can also be ex-
pressed as
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E(ulP) > u(E(xIP»
i.e., the expected utility of the lottery to the risk-prone deci-
sion ·lnaker is larger than the utility of the expected value of
the consequence.
The risk-neutral and risk-averse decision makers are defined
accordingly.
Tne [[multiattribute utility function]] is defined as a
function u(.) from the set of multiattri6ute consequences into
the real numbers. This lneans that it applies to cases \o/here each
uf the mutually exclusive consequences has several attributes.
Multiattribute utility functions, besides having properties (i)
and (ii), also express the decision maker's trade-offs among the
attributes (compare multiattribute value ｦ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｮ Ｉ Ｎ Several spe-
c ial forms of multiattribute utility functions have been
developed, including the additive and the multiplicative forms.
｛ ｛ ｶ ｡ ｬ ｩ ､ ｡ ｴ ｾ ｯ ｮ ｝ ｝
Validation is the process of increasing the confidence that
the outputs of the model conform to reality in the required
range. In some cases the model's output can be compared to data
from historical sources or from an experiment conducted for vali-
dation. A model can never be completely validated; we can never
- /41 -
prove that its results conform to reality in all respects; it can
only be invalidated. Predictive II10dels can be validated only by
judzment, since a model may fit past data well without having
good predictive qualities.
[[value]]
Value can be either objective or subjective; in the latter
case it means subjective worth or importance. For example, "the
value of future benefits to the decision maker," "the value of
c lean air to the soc iety" •
For the purposes of analysis, the subjective values must be
measured on some scale. These measures of value should be based
on preferences expressed by the person or group of interest.
*
In [[value analysis,]] one considers that the value v is re-
lated to the physical or other objective measure y of a conse-
quence by a subjectively defined [[value function,]] so that
v = fey). A value function usually departs from proportionality,
i.e., it usually is a nonlinear dependence.
A typical example is the subjective value of money to an in-
dividual: the first 1,000 schillings in his savings account are
probably of more value to him than the 1,000 schillings that
- 42 -
would increase the state of his account from 100,000 to 101,000
schillings.
The value of a multiattribute consequence with
value-relevant attributes Yl'Y2' ••• 'Yn can be expressed by a
[[multiattribute value function,]] v(Y1'Y2' ••• Yn).
A multiattribute value function must satisfy the following
condition:
if and only if the multiattribute consequence (Yl'Y2' ••• 'Yn ) is
preferred or indifferent to (Yi'Yi' ••• Ｇ ｙ ｾ Ｉ Ｎ
Several theories exist according to which a multiattribute
value function v(·) can in appropriate cases be expressed as an
aggregate of single-attribute functions v.(·). For example, the1 .
additive [[conjoint measurement theory]] assumes that
n
=2:
i=l
v. (y.).
1 1
See also: utility, decision theory.
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[[verification]]
A (computer) model is said to be verified if it behaves in
the way that the model builder wanted it to behave. This means
ｴ ｨ ｾ ｴ the instructions ｾ ｲ ･ correct and have been properly pro-
graillmed. One check for verification is to hold some of the vari-
ables constant to determine whether the output changes in antici-
ｾ ｡ ｴ ･ ､ ways as other variables are changed. Another typical check
is to test how the model behaves in limit situations.
Compare: validation.
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••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• optimization
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T€Phll4H
,:lalPi31a (cost)
3HcPi€HHt:: (valIJe)
Ｓ ｈ ｡ ｾ € ｈ ｈ ･ ｾ ･ ｾ ｈ (tarSet
val'Je)
Mrpa (pla'=l)
Mrpa ａ ｂ ｾ ｘ ｾ ｈ ｾ (two-
person Sanle)
Mrpa MHorMX ｾｈｾ (mul-
t.iperson San,e)
Mrpa c ｈｾｾ･ｂｯａ ｃｾｍｍｏａ
( ｚｦｾ ro- SlJIfl San,e)
MrposaR ｍ ｍ ｈ ｬ ｡ ｾ ｈ ｯ ｈ ｈ ｡ ｒ
MOA€ ｾ｢ (role--
pla'::linS model)
Mrposoe ｈ ｍ ｈ ｬ ｡ ｾ ｈ ｏ ｈ ｈ ｯ ･
MOAe ｾ HPC)8aH l4e
( role-pla'::lir,S)
MrpOI( (pla'::ler)
ｍ ａ ･ ｈ Ｑ ｈ ｾ ｍ ｬ Ｈ ｡ ｾ ｈ ｒ ｍ ｏ ａ ･ ｾ Ｑ Ｔ
(model identifica-
·t.ion)
HepapXHR ｾ ･ ｾ ･ ａ (hierar-
ch'::l of obJectives)
ｈ ｍ ｈ ｬ ｡ ｾ ｍ ｏ ｈ ｈ ｡ ｒ ｍ ｏ ａ ･ ｾ ｢
(simulation model)
ｈ ｍ ｈ ｬ ｡ ｾ ｍ ｏ ｈ ｈ ｾ € ｍ ｲ ｰ ｾ (Sam-
ins)
ｈ ｍ ｈ ｬ ｡ ｾ ｈ ｒ (simulation)
ｍ ｣ ｣ ｾ ･ ａ ｏ ｂ ｡ ｈ ｍ ･ ｯ ｮ ･ ｰ ｡ ｾ ｍ ａ
(operations
Y'esearch)
I4CXOA (nPM "MHorHx
I( f' 14 1e PHRX) ( ITIIJ 1-
tiattribute conse-
Quence)
MCXOA (nPMHHMaeMwx
peweHMA) (conse-·
Ｈ Ｎ ｾ ｵ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ Ｉ
ｍ ｔ € ｰ ｡ ｬ ｍ ｂ ｈ ｾ ａ ｮ ｰ ｯ ｾ ･ ｣ ｣
(iterative process)
I(OMnpOMHC (tradeoff)
1(0HI(pelHO ｯ ｮ ｰ ･ ａ ･ ｾ ･ ｈ ｈ ｡ ｒ
",el1b (tarset)
CM.
••••••••••••••• conseauence
••••••••••••••• value
••••••••••••••• obJective
••••••••••••••• Same theor'::l
••••••••••••••• same theor'::l
••••••••••••••• Same theor'::l
••••••••••••••• same theor'::l
••••••••••••••• nlode 1
••••••••••••••• role-pla'=lins
••••••••••••••• Same theor'=l
••••••••••••••• nlode 1
••••••••••••••• 0bJective
••••••••••••••• nlodel
••••••••••••••• samins
••••••••••••••• silTlulation
••••••••••••••• operations research
••••••••••••••• conseauence
••••••••••••••• conseauence
••••••••••••••• iterative process
••••••••••••••• tradeoff
ｾ •••••••••••••• obJective
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T€PMMH
ｾｏｈｾｾｍｫｬｈ｡ｈ ｃｍＱｾ｡ｾｈｒ
Ｈ｣ｯｮｦｬｩｬｾｴ sitIJa-·
"lion)
ｋ ｏ ｈ ｾ ｾ ｍ ｫ ｬ ｈ ｾ ･ ｾ ･ ｾ ｍ (con-
-flictins obJec-
tives)
ｋ ｯ ｰ ｰ ･ ｾ ｒ ｾ ｍ ｏ ｈ ｈ ｡ ｒ ｍ ｏ ａ ･ ｾ ｢
(correlation model)
I(palKO-CPO"lHOe
ｃ ｬ ｬ Ｂ ｰ ｡ ｈ ｍ Ｂ ｬ € ｈ ｍ ｾ ･
(sho rt-· T'IJn con--
st.T'aint)
I(PM1€PMA (attribute)
I(PMlePMA (criterion)
KPM1€PMA, ｾＢｬｍｬｾｂ｡･ｍｾａ
nPM ｯｾ･ｈｫ･ ｰ･ｾ･ｈｍａ
(value relevant at-
tribute)
I(YPC AeAclBMA (alterna-
tive)
KYPC ａ･ａ｣ｬｂｍｾ (course of
action)
KYPC ａ･ａ｣ｔｂｍｾ (option)
ｾ ｈ ｈ ･ ａ ｈ ｡ ａ ｍ ｏ ａ ･ ｾ ｢ (linear
",odel)
ｾ ｍ ｈ ･ ａ ｈ ｯ ･ nporpaMMMPO-
BaHMe (linear pro-
Sranlln i n9)
ｾ ｍ ｾ ｏ Ｌ ｮ ｐ ｍ ｈ ｍ ｍ ｡ ｾ ｟ ･ ･
peweHMe (decision
IIlaj(.e r )
ｾｍｾｏＬ ｮｐｍｈｍｍ｡ｾ｟･･
peW€HM€, ｈ･ａｔｐ｡ｾ｢ｈｏ
OTHOCR_ero I( ｐｍｃｉＨｾ
(risk-neutral deci-
sion nlaker)
ｾ ｍ ｾ ｏ Ｌ ｮ ｐ ｍ ｈ ｍ ｍ ｡ ｾ ｾ ･ ･
peweHMe, ｃ ｫ ｾ ｏ ｈ ｈ ｏ €
M!!Ideralb PMCl(a
(risk-averse deci-
sion nlaker)
ｾ ｍ ｾ ｏ Ｌ ｮ ｐ ｍ ｈ ｍ ｍ ｡ ｾ ｟ ･ ･
ｰ ･ ｾ ･ ｈ ｍ ･ Ｌ ｃ ｉ Ｈ ｾ ｏ ｈ ｈ ｏ ･ I(
ｐｍｃｉＨｾ (risk-prone
decision maker)
CM.
••••••••••••••• Same ｴ ｨ ･ ｯ ｲ ｾ
••••••••••••••• 0bJective
••••••••••••••• nlode I
•••••••• ｾ •••••• corlstraint
•••• ｾ •••••••••• attribute
••••••••••••••• criterion
••••••••••••••• conseGuence
••••••••••••••• alternative
••••••••••••••• course of action
••••••••••••••• alternative
••••••••••••••• nlode 1
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• decision maker
••••••••••••••• ｵ ｴ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｾ
••••••••••••••• ｵ ｴ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｾ
••••••••••••••• ｵ ｴ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｾ
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AOT€P€R Ｈ ｬ ｯ ｴ ｴ ･ ｲ ｾ Ｉ
ｍ ｡ ｋ ｃ ｈ ｍ ｡ ｋ ｃ ｈ ｾ ｾ ｋ ｐ ｈ Ｑ € ｐ ｈ ｾ
(1l'IaX-max rlJle)
ｍ ｡ ｋ ｃ ｈ ｍ ｈ ｈ ｈ ｗ ｾ KPH1€PHA
ＨＱｬＧｉ｣ｾｾ＼Ｍｭｩｮ rlJle)
MaprHHaAbHaR nOA€aHOClb
(marSinal utility)
ｍ ｡ ｬ ｐ ｈ ｾ ｡ Ｌ ｯ ｮ ｈ ｣ ｾ ｡ ｡ ｾ ｾ ｡ ｒ ｃ ｒ
daAClHc (technoloSi-
cal interdependence
ITlat r i >d \
MaWHHHaR ｈｍｈｔ｡ｾｈｒ (com-
puter simulation)
MaWHHHaR MOA€Ab (comput-
er Dlodel)
MeTOA Ｂａｅｾ｢ｾｈＢ (Aelphi
IJlethod)
M€TOAOAOrHR nOCTPO€HHR H
SHaAH3a ､ ｡ ａ ｡ ｈ ｣ ｯ ･ ｾ ｸ
MCIA€ A€ A (i nput-·
output (Leontief)
｡ ｮ ｃ ｬ ｬ ｾ ｳ ｩ ｳ Ｉ
ｍ ｈ ｯ ｲ ｏ ｾ ｐ ｈ Ｑ € ｐ ｈ ｡ ａ ｢ ｈ ｡ ｒ
ｾ ｾ ｈ ｋ ｾ ｈ ｒ nOA€3HOCTH
(1l'lul ｴｩ｡ｴｴｲｩ｢ｉｊｴｾ｜
utility function)
MHorOKPIIT€PHaAbHaR
｣ ｡ Ｎ ｾ ｈ ｉ Ｈ ｾ ｈ ｒ ｾ € ｈ ｈ ｏ ｃ ｔ ｈ
(multiattribute
value flJnction)
MH03€C1BO ａ ｯ ｮ ｾ ｣ ｔ ｈ ｍ ｾ ｘ Ｉ
Ｎ Ｔ € ｾ € ｾ Ｇ aAbl€PHaTHB,
H l.A. (feasible
set)
MOA€Ab (nlodel)
MOA€Ab, ｐ € ｡ ａ ｈ Ｓ ｾ € ｍ ｡ ｒ Ha
) Ellll (colllPute r'
model)
MOAe ｾ b, ':I" II TI::l Ball ..a R
1"If' H" HHHO-
ｃａ€ａｃＱｂ･ｈｈｾ€ CBR3H
(causal model)
CM •
•••••••••••••• • utilit'd
••••••••••••••• decision theor'd
••••••••••••••• decision ｴ ｨ ･ ｯ ｲ ｾ
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• input-output (Leon-
tief) ｡ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｾ ｳ ｩ ｳ
••••••••••••••• sill'lulation
••••••••••••••• nlode 1
••••••••••••••• Delphi Rlethod
••••••••••••••• input-output (Leon-
tief) ｡ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｾ ｾ Ｎ ｩ ｳ
••••••••••••••• utilit'd
••••••••••••••• value
••••••••••••••• constraint
• •••••••••••••• mode 1
• •••••••••••••• nlode 1
• •••••••••••••• mode 1
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TE:PMMH
ｈ･ｾｍｾｈ･ｾｈｯ･ npOrpaMWKPO-
BaHMe (nonlinear
PT'C)9rallllldng)
ｈ ･ ｯ ｮ ｰ ･ ａ ･ ｾ ･ ｈ ｈ ｏ ｃ ｬ ｢ (uncer-
taint'd)
ｈ ･ ｙ ｾ ｍ Ｑ ｗ ｓ ｡ € ｍ ｏ € nPM ｡ｈ｡ｾﾭ
Kae ｂｾｍａｈｍ･ ｰ･ｾ･ｈｍａ
Ha ｂｈ€ｾｈｍ･ CMC1€MW
(spillover)
ｈ ･ Ａ ｬ ｾ ｍ Ｇ ｬ ｷ ｡ ｡ ･ ｉ ｴ ｬ ｏ € rlPM ｡ｴｬ｡ｾﾭ
Kae ｮ ｯ ｣ ｾ ･ ａ ｃ ｬ ｂ ｍ ･
peweHKR (externali-
t'd)
Ol'pat:M'i€HMe (constraint)
ｏ ａ ｈ ｏ ｾ ｐ ｍ ｬ ･ ｐ ｍ ｡ ｾ ｢ ｈ ｯ ･
Ｑ Ｑ Ｐ ｃ ｾ ｅ Ｚ ａ ｃ ｬ SMe
Ｈｳｩｮｾｬ･Ｍ｡ｴｴｲｩ｢ｵｴ･
conseauence)
ｏ ａ ｈ ｯ ｾ ｐ ｍ ｬ ･ ｐ ｍ ｡ ｾ ｢ ｈ ｷ ｾ MCXOA
(single-attribute
｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ･ ｣ ｾ ｵ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ )
ｏｾｍａ｡･ｍ｡ａ ｮｯｾ･｡ｈｏｃｬ｢
(expected utilit'd)
ｏ ｬ Ｑ ｰ ･ ａ ･ ｾ ･ ｈ ｍ ･ ａ ｯ ｮ ｾ ｃ Ｑ ｍ ｍ ｗ ｘ
ｾ ･ ［ ｴ ｍ Ｇ pelneHMA M
T.A. (feasibilit'd
anal'dsis)
OnpeA€;t€HMe ｾ ･ ｈ ｈ ｏ ｃ Ｑ ｍ
ｯ ｏ ｢ ･ ｾ ｬ ｯ ｂ " KOHKPel-
HWX 3Ha'ieHMA
oObeK1MBHo MBMepeH-
HWX Be;tM'iMH (value
snal'dsis) \
onlMMs;tbHaA C1PSlerMA
(optimum strate9'd)
onTMMS;tbHOe ｰ･ｾ･ｈｍ･ (op-
tillal solution)
onTMMa;tbHWA no napeTO
(Pareto-optimal)
CM.
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• uncertaint'd
••••••••••••••• externalit'd
••••••••••••••• externalit'd
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• conseauence
••••••••••••••• conseauence
•••• : •••••••••• utilit'd
••••••••••••••• s'dstems ｡ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｾ ｳ ｩ ｳ
••••••••••••••• vallJe
••••••••••••••• same ｴ ｨ ･ ｯ ｲ ｾ
••••••••••••••• optimizstion
••••••••••••••• optimizstion
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yePMMH
ｯｮｬｍｍｍＳ｡ｾｍｏｈｈ｡ｦｴ ｍｏａ･ｾ｢
( of,till,ization
model)
ｯ ｮ ｔ ｍ ｾ ｍ Ｓ ｡ ｾ ｍ ａ (optimiza-
tion)
ｯ ｮ ｔ ｍ ｍ ｍ Ｓ ｡ ｾ ｍ ａ nPM ｈ｡ｾｍｾｍｍ
OAHO&! ｾ･ＢＬ･ｂｯｲｴ
ｾｾｈｋｾｍｍ (sinSle-
objective optimiza-
·lion)
ｏ ｃ ｾ ｾ € ｃ Ｑ ｂ ｾ € ｈ ｍ ･ (implemen-
tation)
011(a3 01 nOMCKa
orlT ｍｍ｡ｾ｢ Horo
peweHHR (satisfic-
ｩ ｮ ｾ Ｉ
ｯ ｾ ･ ｈ ｋ ｡ (evaluation)
ｯ ｾ ･ ｈ ｋ ｡ ｡ ｾ ｢ Ｑ ･ ｐ ｈ ｡ Ｑ ｍ ｂ nPM
Hed",aronPMMalllkllX
BH€WHHX ｾｃｾｏｂｍａｘ (a
fortiori ｡ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｾ ｳ ｩ ｳ Ｉ
ｏ ｾ ･ ｈ ｬ Ｈ ｡ MOA€"'" (model es-
tinlation)
napaMe1P (attribute)
napaM€1PklI MOAe"," (model
paT'anleters)
nap1"ft Ｈ ｰ ｬ ｡ ｾ Ｉ
nep€M€HHklIe (decision
vaT'iable)
nepeXOA 01 H€np€PklIBHOA K
AMCI(P€lHOt! noc-
TaHoBKe Ｓ｡ａ｡ｾｍ
(discretization)
ｮ Ｂ Ｌ ｡ Ｑ ･ ｾ Ｈ ｰ ｡ ｾ ｯ ｦ ｦ Ｉ
ｮ Ｂ Ｌ ｡ ｬ ･ ｾ ｈ ｡ ａ Ｄ ｾ ｈ ｋ ｾ ｋ ａ
Ｈ ｰ ｡ ｾ ｯ ｦ ｦ function)
nOileBHOC1b Ｈ ｵ ｴ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｾ Ｉ
ｮ ｯ ｣ ｾ ･ ａ ｃ Ｑ ｂ ｍ ･ nPMHMMaeMklIX
P€WeHMA (conse-
Quence)
ｮ ｯ ｣ ｾ ･ ａ ｃ Ｑ ｂ ｍ ･ ｰ ･ ｾ ･ ｈ ｍ ｒ (im-
pact)
ｮ Ｐ Ｑ ｾ ｐ ｍ 01 nPMHMMaeMoro
PEweHMA (oPPortuni-
1,\:1 cost)
eM.
••••••••••••••• "lode I
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• implementation
••••••••••••••• ｳ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｳ ｦ ｩ ｣ ｩ ｮ ｾ
••••••••••••••• evaluation
••••••••••••••• a fortiori ｡ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｾ ｳ ｩ ｳ
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• attribute
••••••••••••••• model
••••••••••••••• ｾ ｡ ｭ ･ ｴ ｨ ･ ｯ ｲ ｾ
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• ｾ ｡ ｭ ･ ｴ ｨ ･ ｯ ｲ ｾ
••••••••••••••• ｾ ｡ ｭ ･ ｴ ｨ ･ ｯ ｲ ｾ
••••••••••••••• utilitw
••••••••••••••• conseauence
••••••••••••.••• inlF'act
••••••••••••••• Ｐ ｐ ｰ ｯ ｲ ｴ ｵ ｮ ｩ ｴ ｾ cost
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T€PMMH
nOTPedHOClb (demand)
nPEACKaaaHMe (predic-
tion)
nPHHR1"e ｐ ｅ ｾ ･ ｈ ｍ ｾ B
':ICltOBMRX
HE:onpeAe Ite HHOCl "
(decision under un-
｣ ･ ｲ ｴ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｴ ｾ Ｉ
nPMHRTMe ｐ€ｾ･ｈｍａ B
':ICltOBMRX OnpeAelteH-
HOC1" (decision
IJnder ｣ ･ ｲ ｴ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｴ ｾ Ｉ
nPMHR1Me ｐﾣｾ･ｈｍｾ B
':ICltOBMRX PMCKS (de-
cision under risk)
npOB€PKa (verification)
nporHoa (forecast)
npOC1PaHC1BO aitblePHalMB
(action space)
npOC1PaHC1BO MCXOAOB
(conseauence space)
npOC1PaHC1BO ｾ ･ ｬ ｴ ﾣ ａ (ob-
Jective space)
npOClpaHC1BO ｾ ･ ｬ ｴ ･ ａ (tar-
set set)
ｮ ｰ ｏ ｬ ｍ ｂ ｯ ｰ ･ ｾ ｍ ｂ ｾ ･ ｾ ･ ｬ ｴ ｍ
(competitive multi-
ple objectives)
ｰ ･ ｡ ｬ ｴ ｍ Ｓ ｡ ｾ ｍ ａ (implementa-
-tion)
ｐ ﾣ Ｓ ｾ ｬ ｴ ｢ ｬ ｡ ｬ nPM MHOr"X
KPM1£PMRX (multiat-
tribute conse-
auence)
ｰ ･ ｡ ｾ ｬ ｴ ｢ ｬ ｓ Ｑ ｮ ｐ ｍ ｈ ｍ ｍ ｡ ･ ｍ ｾ ｘ
P€WeHMA (conse-
auence)
peWeH"£ (OcHoBHoe) (pri-
ｭ ｡ ｲ ｾ decision)
peWeHM€ 0 10M' KaK npo-
BOAMlb cMCleMHblA
aHSltMB Ｈ ｳ ･ ｣ ｯ ｮ ､ ｡ ｲ ｾ
decision)
CM.
••••••••••••••• demand
••••••••••••••• forecast
••••••••••••••• decision ｴ ｨ ･ ｯ ｲ ｾ
••••••••••••••• decision ｴ ｨ ･ ｯ ｲ ｾ
•••••••••••••••decis1on ｴ ｨ ･ ｯ ｲ ｾ
•••••••••••••••verification
••••••••••••••• forecast
···.····t······conseauence
••••••••••••••• conseauence
•••••••••••••••obJective
••••••••••••••• obJective
••••••••••••••• obJective
••••••••••••••• implementation
••••••••••••••• conseauence
••••••••••••••• conseauence
••••••••••••••• ｳ ･ ｣ ｯ ｮ ､ ｡ ｲ ｾ decision
••••••••••••••• secondarw decision
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T€PhiI4H
PHCI( (risk)
POBHaBE:CHaR ｾ€ｈ｡
Ｈ･ｾｵｩｬｩ｢ｲｩｵｭ price)
｣ ｡ ｍ ｯ ｂ ｾ ｮ ｯ ｾ ｈ ｒ ｾ ｾ ｈ ｾ ｃ ｒ ｮ ｾ ｯ ｲ ﾭ
H03 (self-
fulfilling fore--
cast)
ｃ ｈ ｃ Ｑ € ｍ ｈ ｾ ｾ ｡ ｈ ｡ ｾ ｬ Ｔ ｾ (SYS-
tenls anal':Jsis)
Cl(aARPHaR ｏ ｮ ｬ ｉ Ｔ ｍ ｈ ｾ ｡ ｾ ｈ ｒ
(sinsle-obJective
｣ Ｉ ｰ ｴ ｩ Ｂ Ｌ ｩ ［ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｭ Ｉ
ｃ ｬ Ｈ ｡ ｾ ｒ ｐ ｈ ｡ ｒ ｾ € ｾ ｢ (scalar-
valued obJective)
ｃ ｈ ｉ Ｔ ｾ € ｈ ｉ Ｔ € ｾ ａ € ｾ ｢ ｈ ｗ ｘ ｾ ｡ ｬ ｐ ｡ ｬ
I1f' H paCIIlI4P€H 1414
npOM3BOAC1Ba (econ-
OIlIY of sca 1e)
COC1URHI4€ Ml4pa (state of
the world)
COC10RHI4€ MMPa (state of
the wClrld)
COC10RHI4€ npl4POAW (state
of nature)
cnpoc.' (dentiimd)
ｃ ｔ ｡ ｬ ｈ ｾ € ｃ ｬ Ｈ ｡ ｒ MOA€Ab
(5.tatic nlodel)
ｃ ｔ ｏ ｘ ｡ ｃ Ｑ ｍ ｾ € ｃ ｬ Ｈ ｡ ｒ ｉ Ｔ ｍ ｉ Ｔ Ｑ ｡ ｾ ｍ ａ
(stochastic simula-
tion)
ｃ ｔ ｏ ｘ ｡ ｃ ｬ ｬ Ｔ ｾ ･ ｃ ｬ Ｈ ｡ ｒ ｍ ｏ ａ ･ ｾ ｢
(stochastic model)
ｃ ｔ ｏ ｘ ｡ ｃ Ｑ ｈ ｾ € ｃ ｉ Ｈ ｏ € nporpaM-
MHPOBaHH€ (proba-
bilistic ｰ ｲ ｯ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｭ ﾭ
"'ing)
ｃ ｔ ｏ ｘ ｡ ｃ Ｑ ｈ ｾ € ｃ ｉ Ｈ ｏ € nporpaM-
MHPOBBHH€ (stochas-
tic prosramndns)
ｃ ｔ ｐ ｾ ｬ Ｈ ｬ ｾ ｰ ｡ ｍ ｏ ａ € ｾ ｍ (model
strIJc.,tIJJ'e)
｣ ｾ ､ ｯ ｮ ｬ ｍ ｍ ｈ Ｓ ｡ ｾ ｉ Ｔ ａ (subop-
tinlization)
Chi.
••••••••••••••• J'i sit..
••••••••••••••• demand
••••••••••••••• forecast
••••••••••••••• s':Jstems analysis
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• ･ ｣ ｯ ｮ ｯ ｭ ｾ of scale
••••••••••••••• environment
••••••••••••••• state of the world
••••••••••••••• environment
• •••••••••••••• demarld
• •••••••••••••• nlode 1
• •••••••••••••• Rlodel
• •••••••••••••• Diode 1
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• oPtimization
• •••••••••••••• Diode 1
••••••••••••••• suboptimization
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T€PhlMtl
ｃｾ､｢€ｋｔｍｄｈ｡ｦｴ ｂ･ｰｏｦｴｬｈｏｃＱｾ
(subjective ｾ ｲ ｯ ｢ ｡ ﾭ
bilitY)
ｃ ｾ € ｈ ｡ ｐ ｍ ｾ (scenario)
TeOPMft Mrp (Same theory)
TeOPMR ｮｏｾ€ＳｈｏｃＱｍ (util-
ity theory)
TeOPMR nPMHR1MR P€I;I€HMA
(decision theory)
TeOPMft ｣ｯｮｐｒＪ･ｈｈｾｘ
M3M€P€HMA (conjoint
measurement theory)
ｔ ･ ｸ ｈ ｯ ｾ ｯ ｲ ｍ ｾ ･ ｣ ｋ ｍ ｾ ｋ ｏ ｾ Ｄ Ｄ ｍ ﾭ
ｾ ･ ｈ ｬ (technolosical
coefficie'nt)
ｔ ｏ ｾ ｋ ｡ B npOClpaHC1S€
ｾ € ｾ € ｩ Ｑ Ｑ (target
point)
Ｑ Ｔ ｂ € ｾ ｍ ｾ ･ ｈ ｍ ･ ｾ ａ € ｾ ｢ ｬ Ｚ ｬ Ｚ ｯ ｉ ｘ 3a-
TPal nPM ｰ｡ｃｾｍｐ･ｈｍｍ
npOM3BOAClsa (dise-
conOll'Y of scal e)
ｾ ｃ ｾ ｏ ｂ ｈ ｾ ｾ nporH03 (condi-
tional forecast)
ｾ ｾ ｡ ｃ Ｑ ｈ ｍ ｋ Mrpl:oI (actor)
ｾ ｾ ｡ ｃ Ｑ ｈ ｍ ｋ Mrpw (decision
lTtalc.e r )
ｾｾ｡ｃＱｈｍｋ ｾｋｃｮ･ｐｍｍ€ｈｬ｡
(playeJ')
ｾ ｏ ｐ ｍ ｡ ｾ ｢ ｈ ｡ ｦ ｴ ｍ ｏ ａ ･ ｾ ｾ (for-
RIal Dlodel)
ｾ ｙ ｈ ｋ ｾ ｍ ｒ ､ ｾ ｡ ｲ ｏ ｃ ｏ ｃ Ｑ Ｐ ｦ ｴ ｈ ｍ ｦ ｴ
Ｈ ｷ ･ ｬ ｾ ｡ ｲ ･ function)
ｾ ｙ ｈ ｋ ｾ ｍ ｒ ｂ ｗ ｍ ｲ ｰ ｬ Ｚ ｯ ｉ ｾ ｡ Ｈ ｾ ｡ ｙ ｯ ｦ ｦ
-function)
ｾ ｙ ｈ ｋ ｾ ｍ ｦ ｴ ｮ ｯ ｾ ･ Ｓ ｈ ｯ ｣ ｬ ｍ
(utility function)
ｾ ｙ ｈ ｋ ｾ ｍ ｒ ｮ ｰ ･ ａ ｾ ｯ ｾ ･ ｈ ｍ ｒ
Ｈ ｳ ｵ ｾ ｾ ｬ ｹ function)
ｾ ｾ ｈ ｋ ｾ ｍ ａ cnpoca (demand
'f'unction)
ｾ ｾ ｈ ｋ ｾ ｍ ｦ ｴ ｾ ･ ｈ ｈ ｏ ｃ Ｑ ｍ (value
-fIJrtction)
CM.
••••••••••••••• decision theorY
••••••••••••••• scenario
••••••••••••••• Same theorY
••••••••••••••• utilitY
••••••••••••••• decision theorY
••••••••••••••• value
••••••••••••••• ｩ ｮ ｾ ｵ ｴ Ｍ ｯ ｵ ｴ ｾ ｵ ｴ (Leon-
tief) analysis
•••••••••••••••obJective
••••••••••••••• economy of scale
••••••••••••••• forecast
••••••••••••••• ｲ ｯ ｬ ･ Ｍ ｾ ｬ ｡ ｙ ｩ ｮ ｳ
••••••••••••••• same theorY
••••••••••••••• ｲ ｯ ｬ ･ Ｍ ｾ ｬ ｡ ｙ ｬ ｮ ｳ
••••••••••••••• mbdel
••••••••••••••• utility
••••••••••••••• same theorY
••••••••••••••• utilitw
••••••••••••••• demand
••••••••••••••• demand
••••••••••••••• value
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T€P"'MII
XapaKl€PMC1MKa (attri-
bute)
ｾ ･ ｾ ･ ｂ ｡ ｒ Ｎ ｙ ｈ ｋ ｾ ｍ ｒ (obJec-
t.i ve f'Jr'.cti on)
ｾ ･ ｾ ｍ (multiple obJec-
t.ives)
ｾ ･ ｾ ｏ ｾ ｍ ｃ ｾ € ｈ ｈ ｏ ･ nporpa",-
MHPOaaHH€ (inteser
proSranlnlins)
ｾ ･ ｾ ｢ (soal)
ｾ ･ ｾ ｢ (objective)
ｾ ･ ｾ ｢ Ｈ ｂ ｕ ｬ ･ ｋ ｡ ｾ ｾ ｡ ａ "3 MCX-
OAHUX " ｃｾｏｐＢＧｙｾｍｐｏﾭ
BaHHaR dOllee
I(OHKP€1 HO) ＨｰｲｯＺﾷｾＧＺＺＱ
ｯ｢ｾｪ･｣ｴ ive )
ｾ･ｈｈｏｃｬ｢ (value)
Lte IIOBeK O-hlcHIIH tl Haft M"'M 1a--
LlMR (man-machine
sinlulation)
LteilOSeKo-",amMHHaA Ｂ Ｇ ｏ ａ ･ ｾ ｢
(man-machine model)
3KcnePM",eHl (experimen-
tation)
3KcnePM",eH1MPOBaHMe (ex-
pe1'imentation)
Ｓ ｾ ｡ ｃ Ｑ ｍ ｾ ｈ ｵ ･ ｯ ｲ ｰ ｡ ｈ ｍ ｾ ･ ｈ ｍ ａ
(elastic con-'
straint)
Ｓ ｾ ｾ ･ ｋ Ｑ ｍ ｂ ｈ ｏ ｃ ｬ ｢ (effec-
tiveness)
Ｉ ｾ ｾ ･ ｋ Ｑ ｍ ｂ ｈ ｏ ｃ ｬ ｢ (efficien-
C'::l)
,
••••••••••••••• attribute
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• 0bJective
••••••••••••••• optimization
••••••••••••••• 0bJective
••••••••••••••• 0bJective
••••••••••••••• 0bJective
••••••••••••••• vallJe
••••••••••••••• simulation
••••••••••••••• mode 1
••••••••••••••• experimentation
••••••••••••••• experimentation
••••••••••••••• constraint
••••••••••••••• effectiveness
••••••••••••••• efficienc'::l
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a fortiori analysis. *X Ent: contingency analysis
a fortiori ｾ ｮ ｾ ｬ ｹ ｳ ｩ ｳ ··X ｅ ｾ ｴ Ｚ sensitivity analysis
a fortiori ｾ ｾ Ｓ Ｑ ｹ ｳ ｩ ｳ *E
actio;\, feasible **E(k',"ic for: ｦ ｾ ｡ ｳ ｩ ｢ ｬ ･ ｡ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｾ Ｉ Ent: constraint
action ｳ ｾ ｾ ｣ ･ Ｌ *X Ent: constrai;\t
ｾ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｳ ｾ ｣ ･ **E Ent: consecuence
actor **E Ent: role-playing -
actor **X Ent: model
alternative *x Ent: dominance
alcernative?- ·X Ent: risk
ｾ ｬ ｴ ｾ ｲ ｬ Ｑ ｡ ｾ ｬ ｖ ･ *x Ent: sensltivity analysis
｡ ｬ ｴ ｾ ｲ ｲ Ｎ ｡ ｴ ｬ ｶ ･ *x Ent: utility
alternatlve *X Ent: a fortiori analysis
｡ ｬ ｴ ｾ ｲ ｬ ［ ｊ ｾ ｩ ｜ Ｇ ･ *x Ent: effectiveness
alternative. *X Ent: ｯ ｾ ｰ ｯ ｲ ｴ ｾ ｮ ｩ ｴ ｹ cost
altern:>tive *E
｡ｬｴｾｲｮＳｴｩｶ･Ｌ feasible Ｊ Ｊ ｅ Ｈ ｫ ｾ ｩ ｣ for: feasible alternative) Ent: constraint
alternacives *X Ent: decision theory
alternatives, *x Ent: constraint
｡ ｬ ｴ ･ ｲ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｳ *x Ent: continse;\cy analysis
｡ ｬ ｴ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｴ ｬ ｖ ｾ ｓ ﾷ ｘ Ent: ｣ ｏ ｵ ｲ ｾ ｵ 0: action
｡ ｬ ｴ ･ ｲ ｲ Ｎ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｳ *X Ent: critcrio;\
｡ ｬ Ｚ ･ Ｚ ｮ ｡ ｾ ｩ ｶ ｾ ｳ Ｎ *x Ent: ｾ ｣ ｣ ｩ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｮ maker
｡ ［ ｜ ｡ ｬ ｹ ｾ ｬ ｳ Ｌ a fortiori ·*E (k ...·lc for: a fortiori analysis)
analysis, contingency *·E (kwic for: continge;\cy analysis)
analysis, cost-benefit **E(kwic for: ｣ ｯ ｳ ｴ Ｍ ｾ ･ ｮ ･ ｦ ｩ ｴ analysis) Ent: systems analysis
analysis, cost-effectiveness **S(kwic for: cost-effectiveness analysis) Ent: systems analysis
analysis, decisio;\ ﾷ Ｊ ｅ Ｈ ｫ ｾ ｩ ｣ for: decision analysis) Ent: systems analysis
｡ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｙ Ｖ ｩ ｾ Ｌ !e35ibility Ｊ Ｇ ｅ Ｈ ｾ ｾ ｩ ｣ for: feasibility analysis) Ent: systems analysis
cnalysis, in;:l.:t-cut!=,ut (Leontief) **E (kwic for: input-output (Lco:-.tie[) analysis)
aniJ.lysis, Leontief **5 (k".. ik for: Leontief analysis) Ent: input.-outF-ut (Leontief) ｡ ｾ ｡ ｬ ｹ ｳ ｩ ｳ Syn. for: input-output (Leontief)
｡ ｾ ｡ ｬ Ｉ ｳ ｬ ｳ Ｌ pOllCy *·C(kwic for: policy analysis) Ent: systems analysis
analysls, resource ·*c (kwic for: resource analysis)
analysis, risk **C(kwic for: risk analysis) Ent: riSK
ar.31ysls, risk **5 (kwik for: r ｩｾｫ analysis) Er.t: risk Syn. for: risk assessment
｡ ｾ ｣ ｬ ｹ ｳ ｩ ｳ Ｌ risk-benefit **E(kwic for: ｲ ｩ ｳ ｫ Ｍ ｾ ･ ｮ ･ ｦ ｩ ｴ analysls) Ent: systems analysis
analysis, ｾ ･ ｮ ｳ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｶ ｬ ｴ ｹ **E Ｈ ｾ ｷ ｩ ｣ for: sensitivity analysis)
analysis, ｶ ｡ ｬ ｾ ･ **C(kwic for: value analysis) Ent: value
analytic model *E Cnt: ｾ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ
attribute, value-relevant **C(kwic for: value-relevant attribute) Ent: consequence
｢ ･ ｾ ･ ｦ ｩ ｴ **C Ent: consecuence
benefit **X Ent: ･ ｦ ｦ ｩ ｣ ｩ ｾ ｮ ｣ ｹ
｢ ｾ ｮ ｾ ｦ ｩ ｴ **X Ent: ､ ｩ ｳ ｣ ｯ ｾ ｮ ｴ rate
｢ ･ ｮ ･ ｾ ｩ ｴ ｳ *X Ent: externality
ｴ ･ ｾ ･ ｦ ｩ ｴ ｓ *X Ent: vallIe
ｾ ･ ｲ Ｎ ｾ ｦ ｩ ｴ ｳ *x Ent: ｯ ｾ Ｂ ｯ ｲ ｴ ｵ ｮ ｩ ｴ ｹ cost
｢ ･ ｮ ｾ ｦ ｩ ｴ ｳ Ｌ *X Ent: systens ｡ ｮ ｾ ｬ ｹ ｳ ｩ ｳ
causal ｾ ｯ ｡ ･ ｬ **C Ent.: fuodel
chance-constrained ｰ ｲ ｯ ｾ ｬ ･ ｭ **C Ent: optimization
coefficlent, technological **C(kwic for: technological coefficient) Ent: input-output (Leontief) analysis
｣ ｯ ｾ ｾ ･ ｴ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｰ ｬ ･ objectives **E Ent: ｯ ｾ ｪ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･
｣ ｏ Ｚ ｾ Ｇ ｆ ｾ ｴ Ｎ ｬ ｴ ｬ ｶ ･ ｯ ｾ Ｉ ｣ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｳ *X Ent: siltisficing
ｃ ｖ ｾ Ｒ ｬ Ｎ Ｚ ｴ ･ ｲ ｳ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ *E Ent: ｳ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
conditional fcrccast *E Er.t: forecast
｣ ｯ ｲ Ｎ ｦ ｬ ｩ ｾ ｴ Ｎ situation ·X Ent: ｯ ｾ ｪ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･
ｾ
...,
y'.
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)
constraint Syn. for: stiff constraintEnt:
conflict situation **E -Ent: ｧ ｡ ｾ ･ theory
｣ ｵ ｾ ｦ ｬ ｩ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｧ objectives. *E ｅｾｴＺ objective
conjoint ｾ ･ ｡ ｳ ｵ ｲ ｣ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ theory *E Ent: value
｣ ｯ ｾ ｾ ･ ｾ ｵ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ ·X Ent: externality
｣ ｯ ｮ Ｚ ［ ･ Ｌ Ｌ ｾ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ Ｚ *x Ent: iIT.pact
con:3cvL:ence *E
｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ･ ｾ ｵ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ Ｌ feasible **Elkwic for: feasible consequence) Ent: constraint
｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｣ ｾ ｾ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ Ｌ multiattribute **Elkwic for: multiattribute consequence) Ent: consequence
｣ ｯ ｾ ｳ ･ ｳ ｵ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ Ｌ single-attribute ·*C(kwic for: single-attribute consequence) Ent: consequence
｣ ｯ ｾ ｾ ･ ｾ ｾ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ ｳ ｰ ｾ ｣ ･ Ｌ *X Ent: constraint
｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｣ ｱ ｾ ｣ ｮ ｣ ･ ｳ ｾ ｡ ｣ ･ *·E Ent: consequence
｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｣ ｳ ｵ ･ ｮ ｾ ･ tree *c Ent: ｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ･ ｾ ｵ ･ ｮ ｣ ･
｣ ｯ ｮ ［ ｣ ｾ ｾ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ ｳ Ｎ *X ｅｾｴＺ decision theory
｣ ｯ ｮ Ｕ ･ ｳ ｾ ｣ ｮ ｣ ･ ｳ *x Ent: ､ ｯ ｾ ｩ ｮ ｡ ｮ ｣ ･
｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｣ ｮ ｣ ･ ｳ *Y. Ent: ･ ｮ ｶ ｩ ｲ ｯ ｮ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ
consccuences *x Eot: state of the world
｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｣ ｾ ｵ ｣ ｮ ｣ ･ ｳ *x Ent: utility
ｃ ｏ Ａ ｾ Ｎ ｳ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｜ Ｒ Ｚ ｉ ｃ ｃ ｓ Ｌ *X £nt: ｣ ｯ Ｚ Ｚ ｳ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｴ
｣ ｯ ｾ ｾ ･ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｣ ｑ ｳ ﾷ ｘ Ent: model
ｃ ｏ ｾ ｓ ｣ ｾ ｾ ｣ Ｚ ｬ ｣ ･ ｳ *x Cnt: syste:::s analysis
｣ ｯ ｾ ｓ ｴ Ａ ｾ ｩ ｩ ｬ ｴ ·*x Ent: optiQization
ｃ Ｐ Ｚ Ｂ ｜ Ｓ ｴ ｛ ｾ ｩ ｩ Ｑ ｴ *E
｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｴ ｲ ｾ ｩ ｮ ｴ Ｌ elastic **E(kwic for: elastic constraint) Ent: constraint
constr:;int, long-run **£lkwic for: long-run constraint) Ent: constraint
constraint, ｲ ｅ ｾ ｯ ｶ ｡ ｢ ｬ ･ ··S (kwik f0:: removable constraint) tnt: constraint Syn. for: elastic constraint
cOnStralnt, ｾ ｨ ｯ ｲ ｴ Ｍ ｲ ｵ ｮ ·*E(kwic ｾ ｯ Ｚ Ｚ short-run constraint) Ent: constraint
constrclnt, stiff **E(kwic for: stiff constraint) Ent: constraint
constraint, ｾ ｮ ｱ ｵ ･ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｡ ｢ ｬ ･ Ｌ **S (kwik for: unquestionable constraint)
cu::st':::':":;-ltS). ilX I:nt: objective
｣ ｏ ｮ ｓ ｴ ｲ ｾ ｬ ｮ ｴ ｓ Ｌ *X Ent: ｳ ｹ ｳ ｴ ･ ｾ ｳ analysis
contingency analysis, *X Cnt: sensitivity analysis
contlngency analysis. *x Ent: a fortiori analysis
｣ ｯ ｮ ｴ ｬ ｮ ｧ ･ ｾ ｾ ｹ ｡ ｾ ｾ ｬ ｹ ｳ ｩ ｳ *E
correlation xodel **E Ent: ｾ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ
cost **E Ent: consequence
｣ ｣ ｾ ｴ ·*x ｃ ｾ ｴ Ｚ discount rate
co"t, 0;';;:0rtt.:::ity ·*L (k... ic for: o??ortunity cost)
｣ ｯ ｳ ｴ Ｍ ｢ ･ ｾ ｾ ｦ ｩ ｴ analysis **E Snt: systems analysis
｣ ｯ ｳ ｴ Ｍ ･ ｦ ｦ ｾ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｮ ･ ｳ ｳ analysis. *E tnt: ｳ ｹ ｳ ｴ ･ ｾ ｳ analysis
custs ·X Ent: externality
costs, *x Ent: systems ｡ ｮ ｾ ｬ ｹ ｳ ｩ ｳ
｣ ｯ ｾ ｲ ｳ ･ of action *x Ent: ･ ｸ ｾ ･ ｲ ｩ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
COJrse uf action, *X Ent: state of the world
CCJrse of ｾ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｾ *X ｾｮｴＺ ｃｃｾｅ｣ｾｵ･ｮ｣･
ｃＰｾｲｳ･ o! action; *x ｾ ｮ ｴ Ｚ ｾ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ
｣ ｾ ｾ ｛ ｳ ･ ｯ ｾ action. *X ｾｮｴＺ Ｕ｣･ｾ｡ｲｩｯ
｣ｵｾｲｳ･ of action *X Cnt: syste",s analysis
course of action *-X Ent: ｩ ｾ ｰ ｡ ｣ ｴ
｣ ｯ ｾ ｲ ｳ ･ of action *E
COJrses of action *X Ent: alternative
｣ ｯ ｵ ｲ ｳ ｾ ｾ of action. *X Ent: resource analysis
criterion *X Ent: decision theory
criterlon·X Ent: ｯ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
｣ Ｚ ｩ ｴ ･ ｲ ｬ ｵ ｾ *·X Ent: ､ ｏ ｦ ｦ ｩ ｬ ｮ ｾ ｮ ｣ ･
Ul
co
｣ＨｬｴＮｾｲｩｏＺＱ *S
dec:sion ｡ ｾ ｡ ｬ ｹ ｳ ｩ ｳ Ｎ *E Ent: systems analysis
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decision maker, *X Ent: ｡ ｬ ｴ ･ ｲ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･
､ ｣ ｣ ｩ ｳ ｾ ｯ ｾ ｾ ｡ ｫ ･ ｲ *X Ent: ､ ･ ］ ｩ ｳ ｩ ］ ｾ theory
､ ･ ｣ ｩ ｺ ｩ ｯ ｾ maker *X tnt: environment
de:islon ｾ ｾ ｫ ･ ｲ *X Ent: risk
ｾ ･ ｣ ｩ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｾ ｲ ｲ Ｎ ｾ ｫ ･ ｲ *X Ent: seconddry decision
decision maker *X Ent: utility
decision maker,· *X [nt: value
decizion ｾ ｾ ｫ ･ ｲ *x Ent: ｣ ｯ ｾ ｳ ･ ｧ ｵ ･ ｮ ｣ ･
decision ｾ ｡ ｫ ･ ｲ *X Ent: course of action
ce:lsion IT.aker *X Ent: ｯ ｾ ｪ ｣ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･
declsion roakcr **X Ent: systecs analysis
decision maker **X Ent: ･ ｸ ｴ ･ ｲ ｾ ｡ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ
decision ｾ ｡ ｾ ･ ｲ **X Ent: 3ame theory
decision maker *E
oecision ｾ ｊ ｫ ･ ｲ Ｌ risk-averse **S(kwic for: risk-averse decison maker) Ent: utility
､ ･ ｣ ｩ ｳ ｾ ｣ ｮ ｾ ｡ ｫ ･ ｲ Ｌ risk-neutral **S(kwic ｾ ｯ ｲ Ｚ risk-neutral decision maker) Ent: utility
de:ision ｾ ｊ ｫ ･ ｲ Ｌ risk-prone Ｊ Ｇ ｌ Ｈ ｫ ｾ ｩ ｣ for: risk-prone decision maker) Ent: utility
decisicn makers *X Ent: ｲ ｯ ｬ ｣ Ｍ ｦ ｬ ｾ ｹ ｩ ｮ ｧ
､ ･ ｣ ｩ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｾ ｉ ｔ Ｎ ｡ ｾ ･ ｲ ﾷ ｳ *X Ent: trade-off
cecision, priffiary **E(kwic for: primary decision) Ent: secondary decision
decision, secondary **E(kwic [or: ｳ ･ ｣ ｯ ｾ ､ ｡ ｲ ｹ decision) Ent: secondary decision
､ ･ ｣ ｩ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｾ taker ***5 Ent: decision maker Syn. for: decision maker
､ ･ ｣ ｩ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｾ theory *x Ent: risk
decision theory *X Ent: ｴ ｲ ｾ ｪ ･ Ｍ ｯ ｦ ｦ
W, decision ｴ ｾ ･ ｯ ｲ ｹ *X Ent: uncertainty
ｾ aeclzl0n theory, *X Ent: ｵ ｴ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｾ ｹ
､ ･ ｣ ｩ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｾ theory; *X Ent: utility
de:ision theory. *X Ent: value
､ ･ ｣ ｩ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｾ theory *X Ent:. ｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｣ ｑ ｵ ･ ｾ ｣ ･
decisIon theory). *X Ent: ｯ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｭ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
deCIsion theory *E .
deCIsion under .certainty **E Ent: decision theory
､ ･ ｣ ｩ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｾ under risk *E Cnt: decision theory
decision under uncertainty. *C Ent: decision theory
decision variables, *E Ent: optimization
Cel?hi method *E
､･ｾ｡ｮｪ *E
､･ｾ｡ｮ､ function, *E Ent: demand
cetErministic ｾ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ *E Ent: model
､ ｩ ｳ ｣ ｯ ｵ ｾ ｴ rate **x Ent: systems analysis
｡ ｩ ｚ ｾ ｶ ｷ ｾ ｴ ｲ ｾ ｴ ･ *E
**E Ent: constraint
Ent: sensitivity analysis
Ent: state of the world
Ent: contingency analysis
*E Ent: demand
Ent: optimization
*E Ent: economy of scale
aiscretization *E
diseccncmy of scale,
d:E·.inance *E
ｯｹｮ｡ｾｩ｣ rr.ouel *E
｡ｹｮ｡ｾｩ｣ ｯ＿ｴｩｾｩｺ｡ｴｩｯｮ
･｣ｯｮｯｾＮｹ of scale *E
effcctiver.ess *X
･｛ｦｾ｣ｴｬｶ｣ｮｃＵｓ *E
t:fflcic;;cy *E:
･ｬ｡ｾｴｬ｣ cor.3traint
･ ｮ ｶ ｩ ｲ ｯ Ｚ ｬ Ｎ ｾ Ｌ Ｑ Ｒ ｮ ｴ ［ ·x
･ ｃ ｖ ｬ ｲ ｯ ｮ ｾ ･ ｮ ｾ Ｎ *X
enVlronfficnt *X
cnVHonl:.ent *f:
･ｱｵｩｬｩｴｲｩｵｾ price:
Ent: model
problem **E
Ent: effic iency
Ent: optimization
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estimation, rr.odcl ·*E(kwic for: model estimation) Ent: model
eval ua tion *E
･ｸｾ･｣ｴ･､ ｾｴｩｬｩｴｹ *X Ent: decision theory
eXFected utility **E Ent: utility
･ ｸ ｾ ･ ｲ ｩ ｾ Ｂ ･ ｮ ｴ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ *E
externalities. *x Ent: consequence
externality *E
feasibility analysis. *E Ent: ｳ ｹ ｳ ｴ ･ ｾ ｳ analysis
feasible action **E Ent: constraint
feasible alternative Ｊ Ｊ ｅ Ｈ ｫ ｾ ｩ ｣ for: feasible alternative) Ent: constraint
feasible consequence **E(kwic for: feasible consequence) Ent: constraint
ｦ ｾ ､ ｳ ｬ ｢ ｬ ･ ubjective **£(kwic for: feasible objective) Ent: constraint
feasitle set *£ Ent: ｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｴ ｾ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｴ
ｦ ･ Ｒ ｳ ｩ ｵ ｬ ｾ solution, *E ｾｾｴＺ ｯ＿ｴｩｾｩｺ｡ｴｩｯｮ
ｦ｣ｲｾ｣ｾｳｴ *X Ent: state of the ｾ ｯ ｲ ｬ ､
forecast *x Ent: scenario
forecast *£
ｦ ｯ ｲ ｾ ｣ ｡ ｳ ｴ Ｌ conditional Ｊ Ｊ ｾ Ｈ ｫ ｷ ｩ ｣ for: conditional forecast) Ent: forecast
forecast, ｳ ･ ｬ ｦ Ｍ ｦ ｵ ｬ ｦ ｩ ｬ ｬ ｩ ｮ ｾ **E(kwic for: self-fulfilling forecast) Ent: forecast
forecasting horizon ***5 Ent: forecast Syn. for: forecasting lead
for"castir.g lead *E Snt: forec3st
ｦ ｣ ］ Ｚ ｾ ｾ ｬ ｾ Ｐ ｾ ･ ｬ **E Ent: ｾ ｯ ｾ ･ ｬ
Ｙ ｡ ｾ Ｌ ｣ ｬ ･ ***S Ent: utility Syn. for: lottery
ｳ ｡ ｾ ･ Ｌ ｾ ｾ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｰ ･ ｲ ｳ ｯ ｮ Ｊ Ｊ ｅ Ｈ ｫ ｾ ｩ ｣ for: multiperson game) Ent: game theory
C\ ｧ ｡ ｾ ･ theory, *X Cnt: decision theory
o gai7.e theory, *x Ent: decisio.l ';heory
ga::-,e theory). *X Cnt:' objective
ｾ ｡ Ｂ Ｌ ･ theory *E
ｳｾｾ･Ｎ two-person **C(kwic for: two-person game) Ent: ｧ ｡ ｾ ･ theory
Ｙ ｡ ｾ ･ Ｌ ｺ ･ ｲ ｣ Ｍ ｳ ｾ ｭ **E(kwic for: zero-sum game) cnt: game theory
ｩ ｡ ｾ Ｌ ｩ ｲ Ｎ ｧ Ｎ *X Ent: simulation
ｧ ｡ ｾ ｩ ｮ Ｙ **E Ent: rolc-playing
goal *E Ent: objective
hierarchy of objectives. *S Ent: objective
horizon, forecasting **5 (kwik for: forecasting horizon) Ent: forecast Syn. for: forecasting lead
identification, model **f; (kwic for: model identification) Ent: model
ｩ ｇ ｾ ｡ ｣ ｴ Ｌ *x Ent: risk
ｩ ｾ ｾ ｡ ｣ ｴ Ｉ • *X Ent: ｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ･ ｾ ｵ ･ ｮ ｣ ･
ｩ ｾ Ｂ ｲ Ｍ ｡ ｣ ｴ *E
ｩ｣ｾ｡｣ｴｳ *X Ent: resource analysis
ｩ ｾ ｾ ｬ ･ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｮ *C
input-output (Leontief) analysis *S
ir.?ut-outFut model *E Ent: input-output (Leontief) analysis
intescr ｰ ｲ ｯ Ｙ ｲ ｡ ｾ ｲ ｮ ｩ ｮ ｧ *E Ent: o?timization
ｩ ｮ ｴ ･ ｲ ､ ･ ｾ ･ ｲ Ｎ ｣ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ matrix, technological **E(kwic for: technological interdependence matrix) Ent: input-output (Leontief)
interest rate ***5 Ent: discount rate Syn. for: discount rate
ｩ ｴ ･ ｲ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ process *E
ｪｵ､［ｾＬ･ｮｴ｡ｬ ｾＮｯｪ｣ｬ ·*E Ent: model
Leonticf analysis **S (kwik for: Leontief analysis) Ent: input-output (Leontief) analysis Syn. for: input-output (Leon-
ｬ ｾ ｮ ･ ｡ ｲ i7.ocel **E Ent: model
linear ｰ ｲ ｯ ｧ ｲ ｡ ｭ ｾ ｩ ｮ ｧ *E Ent: optimization
linear ?roc;ra,,:r.-,ing *X Cnt: ｾ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ
long-run constraint **E Ent: constraint
lottery -*£ rnt: utility
ｾ ｡ ｮ Ｍ ｾ ｡ ｣ ｨ ｩ ｮ ･ m0del *E Ent: ｾ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ
｣ ｡ ｮ Ｍ ］ ｾ ｣ ｨ ｬ ｮ ･ ｸ ｾ ｾ ･ ｬ Ｎ ·X Ent: ｳ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
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rean-i.achine simulation **E Ent: ｳ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
marsinal utility **E Ent: utility
ｾ ｾ ｸ Ｍ ｾ ｡ ｸ rule *E Cnt: decision theory
ｾ ｡ ｸ Ｍ ｾ ｩ ｮ rule, *E Ent: decision theory
ｾ ｯ ｣ ･ ｬ *X Ent: input-output (Leontief) analysis
ｭ ｯ ｾ ･ ｬ *x Ent: ｳ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
ｾ ･ ｣ ･ ｬ *X Ent: validation
ｾ ｯ ｣ ･ ｬ *X Ent: verification
ｾ ｯ ､ ｣ ｬ Ｎ *X Ent: consequence
ｾ ｯ ｾ ･ ｬ *·X Ent: ･ ｸ ｰ ･ ｲ ｩ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
!":",0';cl *C
ｾ ｯ ｪ ･ ｬ Ｌ analytic Ｊ Ｊ ｅ Ｈ ｫ ｾ ｩ ｣ for: analytic model) Ent: model
model, ｣ ｾ ｵ ｳ ｾ ｬ *·E(kwic for: causal model) Ent: model
ｾ ｯ ｾ ･ ｬ Ｌ ｣ ｑ ｲ ｲ ｣ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ **L(kwic for: correlation model) Ent: model
ｾ ｯ ｪ ･ ｬ Ｌ oeterministic **E(kwic for: deterministic model) Ent: model
mocel estimation. *E Ent: model
mccel, forrr.al **E(kwic for: ｦ ｯ ｲ ｾ ｡ ｬ model) Ent: model
ｾ ［ ｣ Ｎ ｪ ･ ｬ ide:1tification: * I..: !::1t: rr:odel
ｭｯｾ･ｬＬ ｩｾｾｾｴＭｯｵｴ＿ｵｴ **C(Kwic for: in?ut-output model) Ent: input-output (Leontief) analysis
mceel, ｪ ｵ ｪ ｳ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ ｡ ｬ **E(kwic for: ｪ ｵ ､ ［ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ ｡ ｬ model) Ent: model
"-ueel, linear **E(kwic for: linear ｾ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ Ｉ Ent: model
ｭ ｯ ｾ ･ ｬ Ｌ ｾ ｡ ｾ Ｍ ｾ ｡ ｣ ｨ ｩ ｮ ･ **E(kwic for: ｾ ｡ ｮ Ｍ ｲ ｮ ｡ ｣ ｨ ｩ ｮ ･ model) Ent: model
mocel, o?timization *·E(kwic for: o?timization model) Ent: model
rreJel pilra".eters *'C I::·nt: model
(j\ mcjd, rolc-?laying **C (kwic for: role-playing model) Ent: mocel
..... r.:ccel, simdaticn ··E(kI.,.ic for: simulation model) Ent: model
:;,ece!, stati'c **E (kwic fer: static ffiodel) Ent: model
ｾ ｣ ｾ ･ ｬ Ｌ ｳ ｴ ｯ ｣ ｨ ｡ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｣ Ｊ Ｊ ｅ Ｈ ｾ ｷ ｩ ｣ for: stochastic ｾ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ Ｉ Ent: model
ｲ Ｚ Ｍ Ｎ ｾ Ｇ Ｚ ｣ Ｚ ｊ strL.:·.:ture **£ Cnt: :1:odcl
ｾ ｯ ｾ ･ ｬ ｳ *x Ent: decision theory
ｭ ｯ ｾ ･ ｬ ｳ Ｌ *x Ent: secondary decision
medels.·X Ent: consequence
mceels.·X Ent: ｦ ｯ ｲ ･ ｣ ｡ ｾ ｾ
ｾ ｾ Ｚ ｾ ｩ ｡ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｾ ｴ ･ consequence 'E Ent: consequence
ｭ ｾ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｴ ･ consequence *·X Ent: utility
ｾ ｾ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｡ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｴ ･ ｵ ｴ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｾ ｹ function *E Ent: utility
ｾ ｾ ｬ ｾ ｩ ｡ ｴ ｴ Ｚ ｩ ｢ ｵ ｴ ･ utility functions. ·X Ent: trade-off'
ｾ ｵ Ｚ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｾ ｴ ･ value function, *E Ent: value
ｾ ｵ ｬ ｾ ｩ ｡ ｾ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｴ ･ value function *x Ent: decision theory
ｾ ｵ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｡ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｵ ｴ ･ value function). *X Ent: utility
ffiultiattribute value functions *x Ent: trade-off
ｾ ｾ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｴ ｪ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ optimization. *C EDt: o?timization
ｲ ｮ ｵ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｾ ･ ｲ ｳ ｯ ｮ ｾ ｡ ｭ ･ **C [nt: ｧ ｡ ｾ ･ theory
ｾ ｵ ｬ ｾ ｩ ｾ ｬ ･ ｯ ｢ ｪ ｾ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｳ "C Ent: objective
ｾ ｵ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｰ ｬ ･ objectives **X Ent: satisficing
ｮ ｯ ｾ Ｚ ｩ ｮ ｾ ｡ ｲ ?resramming 'C Ent: ｯ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｲ ｮ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
eljective.·X Ent: ｣ ｲ ｩ ｴ ･ ｲ ｩ ｯ ｾ
ob}ective '*x Ent: role-playing
cc;ectlve *E
ｯｾｪ｣｣ｴｬｶ･Ｌ feasible **C(kwic for: feasible objective) Ent: constraint
acjective function, *E Cnt: ortiffiization
objective, ｾ ｲ ｯ ｸ ｹ **E(kwic for: proxy objective) Ent: objective
oLjcctive, sCalar-valued *·E(kwic fer: scalar-valued objective) Ent: optimization
ｯ ｾ ｊ ｣ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｳ ｰ ｾ ｣ ･ Ｎ 'E Ent: ｯ ｢ ｪ ｾ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･
obJectlve ｳ ｾ ｾ ｣ ･ *X Ent: constraint
ｯ ｾ ｊ ｣ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ Ｌ vector-valued **E(kwic for: vector-valued objective) Ent: optimization
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....
Ent: optimization
Ent: optiffiization
tnt: optimization
Ent: demand
En t: r is k*C
objectives. *X Ent: alternative
objectives *X Ent: decision theory
ｯ ｴ ｪ ･ ｣ ｾ ｩ ｶ ･ ｳ *x Ent: ｧ ｾ ｾ ･ theory
objectives *X Ent: ｯ ＿ ･ ｲ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ ｲ ･ ｳ ｾ ｡ ｲ ｣ ｨ
objectives, *X Ent: consequence
objectives *X Ent: ｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｴ
otjectives *x Ent: ｣ ｯ ｾ ｲ ｳ ･ of action
objectives. *X Ent: effectiveness
objectives, *x Ent: systems analysis
oCJectives, ｣ ｯ ｾ ｦ ｬ ｩ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｧ **L(kwic for: conflicting objectives.) Ent: objective
objectives, hierarchy of **E(kwic for: hierarchy of objectives) Ent: objective
oCJective3, ｾ ｵ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｰ ｬ ･ **E(kwic for: ｾ ｵ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｰ ｬ ･ objectives) Ent: objective
ｯ ｾ ･ ｲ Ｓ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｓ ｬ research ***s ｾ ｮ ｾ Ｚ operations research Syn. for: operations research
｣ ｾ ･ ｲ ｡ ｴ Ｚ ｯ ｮ Ｕ research. *X Ent: ｳ ｹ ｳ ｴ ･ ｾ ｳ analysis
ｯ ｾ Ｒ ｲ ］ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ research *E
ｯ＿ｾｯｲｴｵｲＮｩｴｹ cost *E
ｯｾｴｩｾ｡ｬ c0ntrol problem ***S Ent: optimization Syn. for: dynamic optimization
0f-t1:'".,.=.1. s01ution *E Ent: ｯ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｲ ｲ ｬ ｩ ｺ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
Ｐ ｦ ｴ Ｚ ｾ ｬ Ｓ ｡ ｴ ｬ ｯ ｮ Ｌ *X Ent: decision theory
ｯ ｰ ｴ ｬ ｾ ｬ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｬ ｯ ｮ *X Ent: satisficing
ｯ ｾ ｾ ｩ ｾ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｮ *X Ent: ｳ ｵ ｢ ｯ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｾ ｩ ｯ ｮ
ｏ ｦ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｬ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ *E
ｃ＿ｾｩＡＺＺｬｺ｡ｴｩｯｮ n;odel *E Ent: model·
ｯ ｾ ｴ ｩ Ｂ Ｌ ｩ ｺ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｌ ffiultiobjective **C(kwic for: multiobjective optimization)
ｯ ＿ ｴ ｩ ｾ Ｚ ｌ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ problem, ､ ｹ ｮ ｡ ｾ ｩ ｣ **E(kwic for: dynamic optimization problem)
ｯ ＿ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｌ single-objective **C(kwic for: single-objective optimization)
ｯ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｾ strategy *C Ent: game theory
option ***S Erot: alternative 5yn. fo:: alternative
ｯ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ Ｎ *X Ent: course of action
outcome ***S Ent: consequence 5yn. for: consequence
ｯ ｵ ｴ ｣ ｯ ｾ ･ ｳ *X Ent: sensitivity analysis
Pareto optimal **E Ent: optimization
play Ｊ Ｊ ｾ [nt: game theory
ｾ ｬ ｡ ｹ ･ ｲ **E Ent: game theory
ｰ ｬ ｾ ｹ ･ ｲ ***S Ent: role-playing Syn. for: actor
ｾ ｯ ｬ ｩ ｣ ｹ analysis *E Ent: systems analysis
pt·edictioOl. *t: Ent: forecast
priCE:, ec;uilibrium **i.(kwic for: equilibrium price)
ｰ ｲ ｬ ｾ ｡ Ｚ ｹ decision **E Cnt: secondary decision
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｢ ｾ ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｣ programming *E Cnt: optimization
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｾ ｡ ｢ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ Ｌ subjective **E(kwic for: subjective probability) Ent: decision theory
pro:,le;n
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｳ ｲ ｡ ｾ evaluation *E Ent: evaluation
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｦ ｦ ｩ ｾ ｩ ｮ ｧ Ｌ integer **C(kwic for: lnteger ｰ ｲ ｯ ｧ ｲ ｡ ｾ ｾ ｩ ｮ ｧ Ｉ Ent: optimization
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｾ ｾ ｩ ｮ ｳ Ｌ linear Ｊ Ｊ ｅ Ｈ ｫ ｾ ｩ ｣ for: linear programming) Ent: optimization
ｾ ｲ ｯ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｾ ｾ ｩ ｮ ｧ Ｌ nonlinear Ｊ Ｊ ｾ Ｈ ｫ ｷ ｩ ｣ for: nonlinear programming) Ent: lptimization
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｸ ｎ ｩ ｮ Ｙ Ｌ stochastic **E(kwic for: stochastic programming) Ent: optimization
proxy ｯ ｾ ｪ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ **L Ent: objective
ｲ ･ ｾ ｯ ｶ ｡ ｴ ｬ ･ constraint ***5 Ent: constraint Syn. for: elastic constraint
resource analysis *E
risk, *X Ent: decision theory
risk *X Ent: uncertainty
l ｾｅ［ｫ *X Ent: utllity
risk *x ｅ ｮ ｴ ｾ consequence
r lSk *C
risk analysis
C'I
l',)
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Ent: model
Ent: optimization
Snt: forecast
Ent: a foreiori analysis
Ent: contingency analysis
*r:
Cnt: model
Ent: ､ ･ ｾ Ｎ ｡ Ａ Ｑ ､
Ect: ･ ｸ ｾ ･ ｲ ｩ ｭ ･ ｾ ｴ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
Ent: ｯ ｰ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｾ ｓ research
Cnt: risk
ｅ ｮ ｾ Ｚ secondarY decision
Cnt: course of action
Cnt: ･ ｦ ｦ ｾ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｮ ･ ｳ ｳ
Cnt: ｭ ｯ ､ ｾ ｬ
Ent: ｯ ｢ ｪ Ｌ ｾ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･
**E
risk analysis ***5 Ent: r i5k Syn. fo'r: risk aSseSS::lent
risk assessment *E Ent: risk
risk, decision under **E(kwic for: decision under risk) Ent: decision theory
risk-averse decison maker **E ｾｮｴＺ ｵｾｩｬｩｴｹ
ｲｩｳｫＭ｢･ｾｾｦｩｴ analysis. *x Cnt: risk
ｲ ｩ ｳ ｾ Ｍ ｴ ･ ｲ Ｎ ･ ｦ ｩ ｴ analysis **E Snt: systems analysis
ｲ ｩ ｳ ｫ Ｍ ｮ ･ ｾ ｴ ｲ ｡ ｬ decisiun maker **E Ent: utility
risk-?ronc decision maker **E Ent: utility
risks: *X Ent: systems analysis
role ｰ ｬ ｡ ｹ ｩ ｮ ｾ Ｌ *X Cnt: simulation
ｲ ｯ ｬ ･ Ｍ ｾ ｬ ｡ ｹ ｩ ｲ Ｎ ｧ *E
ｲｯｬ｣Ｍｾｬｾｹｩｮｧ ｾｯ､･ｬ
ｳｵｴＮｩｳｦｬｃｩｾＺＧＺｬ *E
ｳ｣ｾｬｾｲＭｶ､ｬｵ･､ objective **E
ｳ｣｣ｲＮｾｲｩｯＮ *X Ent: forecast
S":ci:t:rlO *E
ｳ･｣Ｐｾ､｡ｲｹ decision *E
ｳｾｬｾＭｴｵｬ｛ｩｬｬｬｮｳ torecast.
sensitlvity dndlysis, *X
ｳ･Ｂｳｾｴｬｶｬｴｹ analysis, *x
ｳ ･ ｾ Ｓ ｩ ｴ ｬ ｶ ｩ ｴ ｹ analysis *E
ｳｲＮ｣ｲｴＭｲｾｮ constraint **C Eot: constraint
ｳ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ Ｖ ｮ *X Cnt: role-playing
ｳ ｬ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｌ *X Ent: secondary decision
ｓ ｩ ［ ｔ Ｌ ｵ ｬ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ *E
ｳ ｩ ｬ ［ Ｌ ｾ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｌ COiOlputer **E (kldc fer: cO::lputer simulation) E:,:t: sir:lUlation
ｳ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｬ ｯ ｮ Ｌ man-machine **E(kwic for: man-machine simulation) Ent: simulation
ｳ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ model *E Ent: model
ｳ ｬ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｮ Ｌ stochastic **E(kwic for: stochastic simulation)
ｳ ｩ ｩ ｡ ｓ ｬ ｣ Ｍ ｾ ｴ ｾ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｵ ｴ ･ consequence Ｊ ｾ tnt: consequence
ｳ ｩ ｮ Ｙ Ｑ ･ Ｍ ｡ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｬ ｢ ｾ ｴ ･ consequences **X Ent: utility
ｳ ｬ ｮ ｾ ｬ ･ Ｍ ｯ ｢ ｪ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｯ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｭ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ **C Ent: optimization
scillover. *E Ent: externality
s?illovers *X Ent: ｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ･ ｾ ｵ ｣ ［ ｣ ･
state of nature ***5 Ent: environment Syn. for: environment
ｳ ｴ ｾ ｴ ･ of the world **X Ent: ･ ｮ ｶ ｩ ｲ ｯ ｮ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ
ｳ ｴ ｾ ｴ ･ or the ｾ ｯ ｲ ｬ ､ *E
scatic "-ojel *S Snt: ｾ ｵ ､ ･ ｬ
sti:f constraint **E Ent: ｣ ｯ ｾ ｳ ｴ ｲ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｴ
stochastic model *E ｅｾｴＺ model
ｳ ｴ ｣ ｣ ｨ ｾ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｣ programming **t ｛ ｾ ｴ Ｚ optimization
stochastic simulation, *E Ent: ｾ ｯ ､ ･ ｬ
strutcgy, ｯ ＿ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｾ ｭ **E(kwic for: ｯ ｰ ｲ Ｍ ｩ ｦ ｦ ｩ ｵ ｾ strategy) Ent: game theory
ｳ ｵ ｴ ｊ ｾ ｣ ｴ ｬ ｶ ･ ｾ ｲ ｯ ｾ ｾ ｢ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ **E Snt: ､ ･ ｾ ｬ ｳ ｬ ｯ ｮ theory
ｳ ｵ ｾ ｾ ＿ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ *E
ｳｾｾｾｬｹ ｛ｵｾ｣ｴｩｯｾ *E
ｳｹｳｴｾｭｳ analysis, *x
ｳ ｹ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｳ 3na:ysls. ·X
ｳ ｙ Ｕ ｴ ･ ｾ ｾ analysis, ·X
ｳ ｹ ｳ ｴ ･ ｾ ｳ analysis *X
systems ｡ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｹ ｾ ｩ ｳ *x
ｳ Ｑ ｳ ｴ ｾ ｾ ｳ analysis, *X
ｳｹｳｴ･ｾｳ analysis *X
ｳｹｳｴ･ｾｳ analysis, *X
ｳｹｾｴｾｾｳ ､ｮｾｬｹｳｩｳ *E
ｴ｡ｲｾ･ｴ Ｊｾ Ent: objective
G\
W
input-output (Leontief) ｡ ｮ ｡ Ａ ｹ ｾ ｩ ｳ
*E Ent: input-output (Leontief) analysis
Ent: operations research
Ent: utility
**C ent: Ｐ ｡ ｾ ･ theory
Ent: cecision theory
Lit: risk
E.nt: ctility
Er.t: ｃ Ｐ Ｚ Ｑ Ｓ ｃ ｾ ｾ ｃ ｮ ｣ ･
Ent: continsency analysis
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target ｰ ｯ ｩ ｾ ｴ *E Ent: objective
ｴ ｡ ｲ ｾ ･ ｴ set. *E ｅｾｴＺ objective
ｴ ｾ Ｚ ｳ ･ ｴ value **E Ent: objective
:echnolo;ical ｣ ｯ ･ ｦ ｦ ｩ ｣ ｩ ･ ｾ ｴ **1:: Ent:
ｴ ･ ｣ ｨ ｾ ｶ ｬ ｯ ｧ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｬ interdependence watrix
tief) analysis
t::z.JE:=-off *E
tr;,;.:e-c[fs *X
ｴｲＮｽｾｬＺＭｯｦｦＬＮ *X
t\o, ...ｾＭ［Ｎ｣ｲ ':0:1 ｳ ｡ ｾ ｬ ･
\,;::::\.': t.,:; It:ty. *X
'::-.c'cr t..: lllty *x
ｌ Ｚ ｾ ｾ ｃ Ｈ Ｇ ］ t..: :.ntv ·X
ｾ ::..; l. ｾ l.:: :. :". \..;. * X
'..;:': ..ｾ l: [ t ｾｾ ; ｾｾ t 'I • X
L:r:-:c:t.Jl::tv *1::
ｌＺｾ . ＮＺＨﾷＺｴＮＬＺＺ［ｴｾﾷＬ d'::-:lf.ion ｵ ｮ ｾ Ｐ ｲ **E(k"'ic for: decis:'on under uncertainty) Ent: decision theory
i,.-;. '..... ｾ Ｚ Ｎ ｜ Ｎ ［ ［ Ｌ Ｎ Ｇ Ｚ Ｇ Ｚ Ｚ Ｇ Ｑ ｾ ｃ Ｐ ｾ ｓ ｴ Ｚ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ Ｌ ［ ｬ ｾ Ｎ ｴ ·**5 Ent: CO:1strair.t. Syn. for: stiff constraint
i..:: Ｚ ｾ Ｌ *;.; Ent: Ｍ Ｚ ･ Ｇ Ｚ ｬ ｳ ｩ ｯ ｾ theory
ｾ Ｚ Ｚ 1:. *X Ent: ｴ Ｈ ｾ ｾ ｾ Ｍ ｯ ｦ ｦ
L:t<. 1:, *,: Ent: v"l\:e
L:':i it Ｊ ｾ
value function)
Ent: utility
Ent: value
Ci'l
ｾ
utilIty, expected *·C(kwic for: expected utility)
utIlIty function *;.; Cnt: cec sion theory
ｌ Ｚ ｾ ｩ ｾ ｬ ｾ ｙ ｦ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｾ **E ｾ ｾ ｴ Ｚ ｾ ｾ ｩ ｬ ty
util:ty function ***s Ent: util ty Syn. for: welfare function
ctility function, ｾ Ｚ Ｎ Ｎ Ｚ ｬ ｴ Ｚ ｣ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｵ ｴ ･ **E(kwic for: rr.ultiattribute utility
L:tility, ｾ ｡ ｲ Ｙ ｩ ｮ ｡ ｬ Ｊ Ｊ Ｚ Ｈ ｫ ｾ ｩ ｣ for: rr.arginal utility) Ent: utility
L::illty theory *E :nt: utility
ｶ ｡ ｬ ｩ ｾ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｎ *X Ent: ｶ ｾ ｛ ｩ ｅ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ
validation. ·X Ent: model
val ｩ ｣ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｾ *E
value. ·X Cnt: decision theory
value, *X Ent: trace-vfE
ｶ ｾ ｬ ｾ Ｚ ･ *E
ｶ ｾ ｬ ｵ ･ ｡ ｾ ｡ ｬ ｹ ｳ ｩ ｳ Ｌ *E Ent: value
ｶ ｾ ｬ ｌ Ｚ ･ ｡ ｾ ｡ ｬ Ｉ ｳ ｩ ｳ *x ｅ ｾ ｴ Ｚ trade-off
valL:e fur.ction, *E Ent: value
value ｦ ｵ ｾ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｌ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｡ ｴ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｢ ｵ ｴ ･ **E(kwic for: multiattribute
ｶ ｡ ｬ ｌ Ｚ ｾ Ｍ ｲ ･ ｬ ･ ｶ ｡ ｮ ｴ attribute **C Ent: consequence
valL:c-relevant attribute **X Cnt: value
vector-valued ｯ ｾ ｪ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ **E Cnt: optimization
verIfIcation. *X Ent: model
verlf:cation *E .
welf6re ｦ ｾ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ *E Ent: utility
zero-sum ｧ ｡ ｾ ･ *E Ent: game theory
function) Ent: utility
